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Abstract 
Existing research findings are mixed on whether increased executive stock option (ESO) use is 
due to favorable accounting treatment enabling earnings management (EM) and opportunism, 
or to efforts to improve pay for performance. I investigate executive compensation changes in 
215 Canadian companies for the years surrounding the amendment to Handbook Section 3870, 
which requires expensing of ESOs. I find that while ESO use was reduced, ESOs still 
dominate share-based compensation. Of the opportunism and EM antecedents examined, only 
political visibility is significant. The substitution rate of RSUs for ESOs is more equal post-
amendment, in keeping with firms being more willing to use RSUs once ESOs had to be 
expensed. However, the pay for performance relationship has not improved post-amendment, 
even for firms who most reduced ESO use. My results overall provide little support for 
opportunism or EM being a key driver of increased ESO use prior to the amendment. 
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Introduction 
In 2004 the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA) issued an amendment to 
Section 3870 of the CICA handbook. This amendment required publicly listed Canadian 
corporations to expense the value of executive stock options (ESOs) in the income statement for 
the first time. This amendment arose in response to perceived abuses of stock options, with one 
article (Ingram, 2002) claiming that prior to requiring expensing, critics felt as if firms were 
“…handing out shares like they were Monopoly money,” (p. 2). In this study, I examine the 
impact the amendment to Section 3870 had on the use of ESOs as well as antecedents and 
consequences of the change in use of ESOs. 
Two rationales are explored in this study to determine why ESOs became so popular in 
the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. The first rationale – improved pay for performance – 
suggests that ESO use increased because the academic community and others recommended they 
could be used as a way to reduce agency costs by aligning manager and shareholder goals. Pay 
for performance has been studied by Hall and Liebman (1998), Jensen and Murphy (1990), 
Merhebi, Pattenden, Swan and Zhou (2006), and Murphy (1998), among others. Hall and 
Liebman (1998) found that the inclusion of stock holdings and ESOs in particular, led to stronger 
relationships between firm performance and executive pay. A desire to improve pay for 
performance is thus one possible reason for increasing use of ESOs in the pre-amendment period.  
The second rationale for the increased use of ESOs was the preferential accounting 
treatment ESOs received in the pre-amendment period. Firms using ESOs were not required to 
show an expense for this type of compensation in their income statement. Therefore ESOs could 
be used by management teams opportunistically (i.e. to hide excessive managerial pay) or for 
non-opportunistic reasons (improved contracting through earnings management). There is a small 
stream of literature examining ESO use and preferential accounting treatment (Aboody, Barth, & 
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Kasznik, 2004; Brown & Lee, 2007; Carter, Lynch, & Tuna, 2007; and Choudhary, Rajgopal, & 
Venkatachalam, 2007).  
In particular, there are four major purposes of this study. The first purpose is to determine 
if the response to the change in Section 3870 led to less use of ESOs, in keeping with the concern 
that it was the favorable accounting treatment driving the growth in use of ESOs. Second, this 
study investigates the types of compensation used to replace ESOs, to provide insight on what 
share-based compensation is used when all forms need to be expensed. Third, it examines the 
antecedents of the reduction in ESOs for compensation, and whether the identified factors are 
consistent with efficient contracting or opportunistic behavior in the use of options prior to the 
changes to Section 3870. Finally, this study looks at the rate of substitution between specified 
compensation alternatives and ESOs to see if this changed when ESOs needed to be expensed, 
and whether pay for performance sensitivities changed as other forms of compensation were 
substituted for ESOs.  
My findings are as follows. There is evidence that Canadian firms reduced ESOs as a 
proportion of total senior management compensation by almost eight percent from the pre-
amendment to Section 3870 period (2000 – 2002) to the post-amendment to Section 3870 period 
(2004 – 2006). This decrease in ESO usage largely occurred in the same period as the amendment 
to Section 3870, and appears unrelated to more general trends over time. Second, other types of 
stock-based compensation increased as predicted when Canadian firms restructured their 
compensation after the amendment to Section 3870. For example, performance share units 
(PSUs) increased from no firms using this type of compensation in 2000 to 14 (6.83%) firms in 
2006. There were also increases in firms choosing to motivate their senior management team 
through restricted share units (RSUs) from around 9% of firms to 32% and share appreciation 
rights (SARs) - less than 5% in 2000 versus 8.29% in 2006. Bonuses as a percentage of total 
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compensation also increased from an average of 21% in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 
period to 26% in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period.  
However, the majority of firms included in this study continue to use ESOs as an 
executive compensation component, and ESOs are still the primary form of stock-based 
compensation, comprising about 16% of total compensation (RSUs, the next largest stock-based 
compensation component only accounts for around 6%). This implies that while there may have 
been a reaction to the amendment to Section 3870, ESOs continue to dominate, perhaps because 
of their usefulness in tying executive compensation to firm performance. 
The amendment to 3870 should have led to a significant decline in ESO use for those 
firms who used ESOs for earnings management or because of managerial opportunism, if these 
were major reasons for ESO use. However, few of the factors associated with earnings 
management or managerial opportunism were found to be significant: there was no support for 
hypotheses that firms with stronger corporate governance in the pre-amendment period decreased 
ESO use less post-amendment than firms with weaker corporate governance, or that firms used 
ESOs in the pre-amendment period to achieve earnings benchmarks, or that firms closer to 
earnings based debt covenants decreased ESO use more. The only earnings management factor 
found to be significant was political visibility: firms that are more politically visible were more 
likely to reduce the amount of ESOs offered to senior management in the post amendment period. 
 One pay-for-performance factor was also considered: firms with more growth 
opportunities were expected to have smaller changes in ESO use associated with the amendment; 
as such firms should not have been affected by the change in accounting treatment. There was 
support for this factor being associated with smaller changes in ESO use.  
I then examine two possible consequences of the change in ESO accounting treatment. 
The first was the rate of substitution between ESOs and RSUs. The substitution rate of RSUs for 
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ESOs was explored and was determined to be 16 cents of RSUs for one dollar of ESOs in the 
pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. This finding supports the prediction that the substitution 
rate between these forms of compensation is unequal and RSUs were substituted at less than a 
dollar for dollar basis for ESOs. It was also determined that the substitution rate between RSUs 
and ESOs was less unequal in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period (23 cents of RSUs for 
one dollar of ESOs). This higher substitution rate supports the prediction that ESOs became more 
costly (less preferred) for firms once the preferred accounting treatment was removed. The post-
amendment substitution rate is also closer to that predicted by Hall and Murphy (2002), as 
expected. This finding implies that if firms can use less RSUs (compared to ESOs) to provide the 
same level of incentives to managers; pay for performance relationships should strengthen.  
The last prediction and second consequence of reduction in ESO use concerns pay for 
performance. The final hypothesis of this study predicted a stronger link between pay and 
performance after the amendment to Section 3870, if in fact the amendment reduced abuse of 
ESOs, and other forms of compensation were substituted that were less costly for the firm. This 
hypothesis was not supported, even for firms who reduce their ESO use more than the median. 
Taken together, the results of this study provide only modest evidence that earnings management 
or managerial opportunism were the dominant drivers of ESO use in Canada.  
This study makes several contributions. First, previous studies have examined ESOs role 
in earnings management and managerial opportunism. This prior research (Aboody et al., 2004; 
Bodie, Kaplan, & Merton, 2003; Choudhary, et al., 2007) has suggested that the increase in ESO 
use was due to preferential accounting treatment. In contrast to these studies, my findings suggest 
that earnings management was not the dominant factor in the increase in ESO use in the pre-
amendment period. My findings may be different for various reasons including the Canadian 
setting used (which is discussed below) and the research design and models that were used (also 
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discussed below). Also, the studies mentioned above examined firms that chose to voluntarily 
expense ESOs, whereas I study a sample of firms that include both early adopters and those who 
changed only when the regulation became effective. My sample is thus likely to be more 
representative of the population as a whole. The ongoing popularity of ESO use even after the 
favorable accounting treatment was removed suggests that pay for performance concerns could 
be a credible reason for ESO use. 
This paper is an extension of Brown and Lee (2007), who explore the same issue in a U.S 
context. I refine their work by adding other factors that have been found to be significant or 
added as additional controls. This improves overall explanatory power as suggested by an 
increase in the adjusted R
2, 
and helps me eliminate some confounds. I also examine temporal 
trends and pay for performance sensitivities where Brown and Lee (2007) examine abnormal 
compensation.  
Another contribution of this study is that firms with different characteristics had the 
opportunity to be included because some explanatory factors such as corporate governance were 
hand collected. Many studies of executive compensation, including Brown and Lee (2007), use 
the ExecuComp database to provide information on the determinants of executive compensation. 
Use of ExecuComp means certain types of firms with different compensation contracts are not 
included in the samples, and are therefore not part of the ExecuComp database (Cadman, Klasa, 
& Matsunaga, 2007, p.1). This difference in data sources may be one cause of variation in 
findings between Brown and Lee (2007) and this study.  
My sample also provides two more reporting years to analyze compared to Brown and 
Lee, which uses U.S. data. U.S. corporations were required to expense ESOs for “fiscal years 
beginning on or after June 15, 2005 – i.e., the first quarter of 2006 for most public companies,” 
(Choudhary et al., 2007, p. 7). This is important because changes in compensation contracts can 
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be more thoroughly examined in the Canadian setting as firms have had more time to adjust. I 
show that the change in ESO use has largely stabilized in the two years after the amendment to 
Section 3870 in 2004.  
This study also contributes to the stream of literature examining pay for performance 
sensitivities. Just as others (Hall, & Liebman, 1998; Mehran, 1995; Merhebi et al., 2006) have 
found ESOs increase pay for performance, my study shows that an ESO reduction does not 
improve pay for performance sensitivities. A strength of this study was that I was able to study 
the use and effect of ESOs where the preferential accounting treatment was no longer available, 
which helps in disentangling pay for performance effects on their use.  
This study also used a different setting than the previous U.S. based papers - Canada. This 
setting is interesting for numerous reasons in addition to providing two more years of data to 
analyze, including: differences in industry structure, dissimilar monitoring, lack of pro-forma 
disclosure and differences in firm size. First of all, a Canadian setting is interesting to explore 
because Canada did not have pro-forma (footnote) disclosure of ESOs until 2002 whereas pro-
forma disclosure has been required in the US since 1995. This implies that the potential for 
opportunistic use of ESOs was greater than in the U.S.  
Another reason Canadian data is interesting is because of the size of Canadian firms. 
Cadman et al. (2007) find that ExecuComp includes most of the large, publicly traded 
corporations in the U.S. and this sample omits smaller firms. Therefore “little is known regarding 
the compensation practices, or governance characteristics of the smaller firms that are not 
included in the database,” (Cadman et al., 2007, p. 1). Cadman et al. (2007) suggest that future 
research should include these smaller corporations to create meaningful insights into the area of 
executive compensation and how executive compensation is affected by corporate governance. 
Canadian firms are usually smaller than their American counterparts. Brown and Lee’s mean 
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SIZE (natural logarithm of the market value of equity) was 7.33 whereas in this sample it was 
around 2, so this study does provide some insight on the compensation practices of smaller firms.      
Another difference in Canadian and American firms can be attributed to the difference 
between the structure of Canadian and U.S. firms (Zhou, 2000). For example, Canadian firms are 
usually smaller and more closely held than U.S. firms. This study finds that almost half of the 
firms in the sample were closely held (block holders owning twenty percent or more). Park, 
Nelson, and Huson (2001) suggest that in closely held firms, “information asymmetry between 
the board and firm executives is likely to decrease, as monitoring becomes more efficient,” (p. 
349). This implies that corporate governance in closely held firms is stronger and will impact 
compensation structure. This may be one reason why there was no evidence of opportunistic 
earnings management – Canadian firms are more closely held and therefore there was less 
opportunistic use of ESOs by managers. 
Finally, the industry structure is also different in Canada (Zhou, 2000, p. 214) and as a 
consequence, results are expected to be different because industry may impact the type of 
compensation contracts written. “For example, resources firms including mining, minerals and oil 
and gas constitute 29.5 per cent of Canadian firms,” (Zhou, 2000, p. 214) and these industries 
only make up 2 – 3 per cent of U.S. firms. There are approximately 20% of firms in this sample 
in the mining, minerals and oil and gas industry which is comparable to Zhou. This industry is 
included in the group of large ESO users in the pre-amendment period. The largest industry in a 
similar study conducted by Brown and Lee (2007) in the U.S. setting, was the aerospace and 
defense industry (11.1%) followed by the communication equipment industry (9.4%). The 
mining industry only accounts for about 9% of firms in Brown and Lee’s (2007) sample.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section Two discusses related 
literature and builds the hypotheses for the study. The sample selection, data sources, and 
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industry structure is discussed in Section Three. Hypotheses 1a and b are presented in Section 
Four, while H2 – 6 are addressed in Section Five. Sections Six, and Seven show results for H7a 
and b and H8 respectively. Finally, the conclusion is included in Section Eight.     
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Literature Review and Hypothesis Building 
Background of Section 3870 
U.S. Timeline 
Since 1972, ESOs were valued based on Opinion 25 of the Accounting Principles Board 
(APB). According to APB 25, organizations issuing ESOs were required to show an expense 
equal to the difference between the market value and the exercise price on the date the option was 
granted. The difference between the two values is referred to as the intrinsic value. The majority 
of organizations would set the exercise price equal to the market value at the grant date, resulting 
in an expense of zero. 
 Although skepticism and criticism with regards to APB 25 began as early as 1982, the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) did not address the issue until 1993 when it 
proposed Statement No. 123. This exposure draft would have required organizations to show an 
expense on the income statement based on the fair value of an option on the grant date. 
Organizations were provided with an option pricing model – the Black-Scholes method – that the 
FASB supported. This exposure draft was met with opposition from Congress, the SEC and other 
interested parties and as a result, was quickly dropped.  
In 1995, the issue was discussed again and the FASB decided to require supplementary 
disclosure of this information in the footnotes of the financial statements (referred to as pro forma 
disclosure). The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) issued a standard in February 
2004 that required companies using international standards to value stock options using fair value 
measurements (Choudhary et al., 2007, p. 7). In response to the IASB’s issuance, the U.S. 
amended FAS 123 and required corporations to show an expense on the income statement 
beginning on or after June 15, 2005. 
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Canadian Timeline 
Prior to January 1, 2002 firms in Canada were required to disclose a note describing their 
stock option plans, as well as the options granted and exercised. In 2001 the Canadian Institute of 
Chartered Accountants (CICA) introduced the exposure draft for stock-based compensation and 
after receiving comments, required firms to include pro forma disclosure, (Section 3870) January 
1, 2002. On October 30, 2002 David Smith, the president and CEO of the CICA spoke out about 
investor confidence as a result of Enron and WorldCom Scandals. Smith stated that Canada 
would be taking the necessary steps “to strengthen the financial reporting system, as well as our 
own profession’s discipline process, practice inspection system and rules of conduct,” (Smith, 
2002). The Accounting Standards Oversight Council (AcSOC) decided to broach the issue of 
forcing Canadian companies to expense the cost of ESOs and introduced a new Exposure Draft 
outlining the amendment to Section 3870, to be discussed over a 90 day period beginning January 
1, 2003. In September 2003, Canadian corporations were forewarned that they would have to 
expense options beginning January 1, 2004 (CICA Standards and Guidance Collection, 2002). 
Canada took the global lead and adopted the policy for fiscal years beginning on or after January 
1, 2004 for public companies. Figure 1 summarizes this section and provides a timeline of the 
events. 
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Figure 1 Timeline of Events 
 
The Increased Use of Stock Options in Management 
Compensation – Alternative Explanations 
The use of ESOs in management compensation became very popular in the 1990s. 
Yermack (1995) found that stock option awards represented about one third of CEO 
compensation in the early nineties in the U.S, which was an increase from one-fifth in 1984. 
Boschen and Smith (1995) found that noncash rewards such as ESOs grew rapidly and increased 
“from 9.4% of total pay in 1970 to 45% of total pay in 1990,” (p. 590). An article written by 
Zhou (2000), examining Canadian corporations claims that “among the TSE 300 firms, 90 per 
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cent had an annual bonus plan and used stock options in compensating their executives,” (p. 217). 
There are various rationales provided for this increase in stock option popularity.  
Stock Price 
One rationale suggests the increase was due to the increase in security prices over the 
period, making options more lucrative for those who received them. Although this is one 
explanation for the increase in the use of ESOs, it is not the focus of this particular study.  
Pay for Performance 
The need for pay-for-performance arises from agency theory concerns about the 
separation of ownership from control inherent in corporations. This separation naturally gives 
rise to concerns on how to motivate agents/managers to exert effort and thus act in the best 
interests of the principals/owners, i.e. to maximize firm value.  
In agency theory, agents/managers are assumed to be self-interested and to want to 
maximize their own utility, including minimizing effort, leading to the conclusion that “…the 
agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal,” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 5). 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that the principal can limit these agency problems by 
“establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring monitoring costs designed to 
limit aberrant activities of the agent,” (p. 5). In particular, agency theory suggests that 
compensation contracts should make managerial pay a function of firm performance (and hence 
related to shareholder returns), so that the required alignment of interests is achieved (Watts & 
Zimmerman, 1986).  
Agency theory provided a useful framework to address concerns expressed by 
government and the business press that executive compensation was poorly linked to firm 
performance. In 1994, Fortune Magazine wrote, “many employers want to make pay more 
variable, rising and falling with the company's fortunes,” (Fierman, 1994). Many articles were 
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written (e.g. Boschen & Smith, 1995; Garen, 1994; Hall & Liebman, 1998; Haubrich, 1994; 
Jensen & Murphy, 1990; Mehran, 1995) among others, examining whether pay for performance 
led to improved firm performance. In support of agency theory, for example, Mehran (1995) 
finds that “the form, rather than the level, of compensation is what motivates managers to 
increase firm value,” (p. 164). The question then becomes what measure of firm performance 
should be used in pay for performance compensation contracts? Two problems arise regarding 
the question of using accounting-based performance measures such as net income. 
First, accounting-based measures may not be sufficient to reduce agency costs, as 
managers have the means to manipulate accounting, including the net income number (Murphy, 
1998). Second, management may provide appropriate effort, but still not achieve bonuses when 
accounting-based measures are used. For example, some managers may engage in positive net 
present value projects that are risky with longer-term payoffs, such as significant research and 
development. Such high risk long term projects decrease the chances of managers receiving their 
bonuses in the short-term. In this situation management has behaved appropriately, but still may 
not achieve their bonus due to not reaching their target net income number. Murphy (1998) 
describes accounting-based measures as “… inherently backward-looking and short-run,” 
(Murphy, 1998, p. 14). 
As a result of these two problems, using net income as the only measure of CEO 
compensation is not sufficient. Holmstrom (1979) suggests that more than one performance 
measure is necessary to increase contracting efficiency and that measures include ones based on 
net income and share price. Holmstrom suggests that share price is acceptable as a measure of 
managerial effort as it is directly observable by the owner and the manager (and thus less subject 
to manipulation by the manager), and incorporates estimates of the future cash flows from 
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projects with long-term payoffs. Fama (1980) makes a similar recommendation for the use of 
stock-based compensation. This is one possible explanation for the increased use of ESOs. 
Managerial Opportunism and Earnings Management  
Other reasons for the increased use of ESOs stemmed from the preferential accounting 
treatment: organizations were offering their top executives ESOs because they did not have to 
show an expense on their income statement in either Canada or the U.S. Jeffrey Skilling (former 
CEO of Enron Co.), made the following statement, “You issue stock options to reduce 
compensation expense and therefore increase your profitability,” (Poitras, 2006, p. 1). With 
CEOs having this attitude, some firms had vast differences in reported net income and net income 
as it would have been if ESOs had been expensed. For example, “had AOL Time Warner in 2001 
reported employee stock option expenses as recommended by SFAS 123, it would have shown an 
operating loss of about $1.7 billion rather than the $700 million in operating income it actually 
reported,” (Bodie et al., 2003, p.64). Hall and Liebman (1998) also suggest that the other 
explanation for the increase in stock option use was due to accounting treatment of ESOs.  
These points suggest ESOs could have been used potentially for either opportunistic 
reasons (such as hiding excessive managerial pay) or non-opportunistic earnings management 
(such as improved contracting efficiency). However as Brown and Lee (2007), note “mandated 
expensing raised the accounting cost of ESOs to their approximate fair values, forcing firms to 
reconsider the costs and benefits of ESO compensation,” (p. 3). To the extent that the use of 
ESOs was due to preferential accounting treatment, the amendment of Section 3870 (the 
equivalent to FAS-123R in the U.S.) requiring firms to expense ESOs “will cause firms to switch 
to more cost-efficient forms of compensation to minimize compensation expenses,” (Brown & 
Lee, 2007, p. 3.)  
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Existing Research on ESO Expensing 
Recently, Aboody, Barth and Kasznik, (2006), Brown and Lee, (2007), and Choudhary et 
al., (2007), have looked at the responses by U.S. companies to FAS 123-R (which required ESOs 
expensing in the U.S.). These studies provide various insights into the effect the amendment to 
this standard has had. For example Choudhary et al. (2007) look specifically at corporations who 
chose to accelerate ESOs' vesting period in response to FAS 123-R, while Aboody et al. (2006) 
look at firms that chose to expense ESOs early. These two studies do not provide evidence on the 
change in use of ESOs in response to FAS-123R.  Brown and Lee (2007) attempt to identify the 
firm-specific factors that explain ESO reduction as well as examine how firms restructured their 
compensation practices in conjunction with ESO cutbacks in response to FAS-123R.  
This study follows Brown and Lee’s (2007) study in that it attempts to understand the 
effect of the change in accounting standard on ESO use.  However, I am more explicitly trying to 
contrast the pay for performance versus earnings management/opportunism rationales for ESO 
use. It is also worth noting that Canadian data may provide more insight into this area of research 
since pro-forma disclosure did not even occur in Canada until 2002, making either opportunistic 
or earnings management use of ESOs more difficult to detect.  
Given two possible explanations for ESO use, Canadian corporations that benefited from 
the preferential accounting treatment of ESOs prior to the amendment to Section 3870 are more 
likely to reduce the use of ESOs in compensation packages once expensing of ESOs was 
required. These corporations will gravitate towards more cost efficient forms of compensation. 
Other corporations using them primarily for pay-for-performance reasons should remain 
unchanged in their use. The joint effect of these two explanations should thus lead to an overall 
reduction in use when considering Canadian firms as a whole. 
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This leads to the first hypothesis (senior management refers to the top 5 executives in a 
firm for the remainder of the paper):   
H1a: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management has decreased 
since the amendment to Section 3870 has gone into effect. 
 
In evaluating H1a, consideration of the relative magnitude of the change in ESO use 
should provide some insight into the relative importance of the competing explanations (pay-for-
performance and preferential accounting treatment).  
In a 2007 study Carter et al. found that “firms expensing stock options are granting fewer 
options and more restricted stock,” (p. 355). The Carter et al. (2007) study analyzed changes in 
the structure of CEO pay packages concurrent with and after the decision to expense options 
(Carter et al., 2007, p. 354). They contribute their findings to the role of accounting in equity 
compensation design – firms could no longer avoid reporting an expense for ESOs. They suggest 
that firms are moving towards using more restricted stock in order to provide longer-term 
performance incentives “and that there will likely be changes in CEO compensation now that 
SFAS No. 123(R) is in effect,” (Carter et al., 2007, p. 355).  If fewer ESOs are used for executive 
compensation, the next question that arises is what compensation alternatives will be used 
instead?   
 Hall and Murphy (2002) find that “when existing compensation is adjusted, incentives 
are maximized through restricted stock grants rather than options,” (p. 26). This is ultimately 
because executives’ value restricted stock grants more highly than options, (Hall & Murphy, 
2002, p. 26).  
Another study completed prior to the SFAS No. 123(R) by Seethamraju and Zach (2003) 
looked at early adopters that chose to expense ESOs and they also looked at changes in 
compensation structure made by these early adopters. They found that firms that chose to expense 
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ESOs early made almost immediate changes to their compensation plans and 28% of these were 
major revisions. They define major changes in executive compensation as changes that “involve 
direct changes to option-based compensation and include total revisions to the entire 
compensation plans as well as changes in mix between, for example, options and restricted 
stock,” (Seethamraju & Zach, 2003, p. 37). It is therefore predicted that there will be an increase 
in other types of stock-based compensation similar to patterns of early adopters in the U.S.  
(Seethamraju & Zach, 2003) and the following is hypothesized: 
 
H1b: The proportion of compensation from other types of stock-based compensation for 
senior management has increased since the amendment to Section 3870 has gone into 
effect.
1 
 
 
Earnings Management for Opportunistic Reasons 
Since managers have the ability to manipulate net income in their favor, use of 
performance measures in management compensation sometimes results in opportunistic earnings 
management by managers to boost their compensation (Healy & Wahlen, 1999), rather than 
exerting effort to affect the performance measure. Such behavior is opportunistic as manager’s 
benefit in the short term, but shareholders do not benefit in the long term as they would have if 
effort had been exerted instead.  
Prior research has established that managers do behave opportunistically. Healy (1985) 
conducted an investigation of a contractual motivation for earnings management. His results 
show that managers manage income up or down depending on how close they are to ceilings and 
floors in their bonus contracts. Other studies suggesting opportunistic behavior by managers to 
improve compensation include Holthausen, Larker, and Sloan (1995) and Yermack (1997). Prior 
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to the amendment to Section 3870, there was an opportunity for CEOs to improve their firm's 
bottom line and thus increase their compensation through the use of ESOs.  
Managers of firms that had poor corporate governance prior to the amendment to Section 
3870 had more scope to be opportunistic and thus gain higher compensation through the 
preferential accounting for ESOs. However, Guay, Kothari, and Sloan (2003) suggest that 
mandatory expensing of ESOs increases the visibility of option-based compensation and 
highlights the cost of ESOs. This in turn makes it more difficult for CEOs in poorly governed 
firms to increase their compensation and manage earnings through the use of ESOs. Thus, the 
amendment to Section 3870 may have enabled corporate boards to better scrutinize CEO 
compensation packages and ESO use. Therefore, similar to Brown and Lee (2007), it is predicted 
that “the reduction in ESO use is greater for more poorly governed firms,” (p. 10), in the pre-
amendment to Section 3870 period. This leads to the second hypothesis (stated in terms of 
stronger corporate governance):    
 
H2: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management for corporations 
with stronger corporate governance has decreased less than corporations with weaker 
corporate governance since the amendment to Section 3870 has gone into effect. 
  
 
Earnings Management for Non-Opportunistic Reasons 
Managers may choose accounting policies or estimates that affect earnings to improve 
contracting efficiency, as well as to respond to attention from third parties, such as government 
and unions, who can affect firm profitability. Changes in accounting standards may therefore 
have “economic consequences” as they affect the choice of standards and estimates available 
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), and thus current and future contracting costs and relationships with 
third parties who have an interest in the financial statements (Zeff, 1978). These economic 
 19 
 
consequences can lead to a wealth transfer that is passed onto the shareholders in the form of a 
stock price increase or decrease (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986).  
Previous research on the economic effects of passage of new accounting standards 
includes a paper by Mittelstaedt, Nichols, and Regier (1995) where they examine reductions in 
health care benefits associated with the passage of SFAS 106. SFAS 106 required financial 
statement recognition of health care costs. Another example is provided by Lev (1979), who 
examined how interested parties responded to a proposed standard in the U.S. that would have 
required oil and gas corporations to account for exploration using the successful efforts method. 
There are three non-opportunistic uses of ESOs that this study explores with regards to 
explaining firm specific responses to the changes to Section 3870: pressure to meet or beat 
earnings benchmarks, debt contracting concerns, and avoidance of political costs. 
Earnings Benchmarks. Scott (2006) suggests earnings management is sometimes used to 
meet investors’ earning expectations. “Firms that report earnings greater than typically expected 
enjoy a significant share price increase,” (Scott, 2006, p. 353). On the other hand, firms that do 
not meet earnings expectations experience share price decreases. Studies done by Bartov, Givoly, 
and Hayn (2002) and Skinner and Sloan (2002) found that the market penalizes firms that do not 
meet earnings targets more than it rewards firms for exceeding targets.  
Before the amendment to Section 3870, the preferential accounting treatment of ESOs 
gave corporations a vehicle to achieve earning expectations. Therefore corporations that used 
ESOs extensively to achieve earnings benchmarks will be more likely to reduce ESO use more 
than other corporations. This leads to Hypothesis Three:  
 
H3: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management for corporations 
that use ESOs’ favorable accounting treatment to achieve earnings benchmarks has 
decreased since the amendment to Section 3870 has gone into effect. 
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Debt Contracting Concerns. Watts and Zimmerman (1986, 1990) contend that in order to 
meet accounting-based debt covenants, managers will make choices that do not violate these 
already negotiated contracts. The costs of renegotiating these contracts can be quite high and 
result in higher interest rates (Beneish & Press, 1993; DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Dichev & 
Skinner, 2002; Sweeney, 1994). Using ESOs in compensation packages allowed firms to avoid 
violation of debt covenants since they did not have to be expensed. Since the amendment to 
Section 3870, firms are more likely to violate these covenants and will want to choose 
compensation components that do not violate debt covenants. If earnings management was a 
motivating factor for ESO use, the loss of the ability to use ESOs as an earnings management 
device will cause firms to consider other compensation alternatives. Therefore corporations with 
more binding earnings based covenants prior to the amendment to Section 3870 are likely to cut 
back more on ESOs (Brown & Lee, 2007, p. 8). This leads to the fourth hypothesis:  
 
H4: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management for corporations 
that are closer to earnings based debt covenants has decreased since the amendment to 
Section 3870 has gone into effect. 
 
 
Political Costs. “All other things being equal, the greater the political costs faced by a 
firm, the more likely the manager is to choose accounting procedures that defer reported earnings 
from current to future periods,” (Scott, 2006, p. 243). This is referred to as the political cost 
hypothesis. “Larger and more profitable firms are more sensitive to political pressure,” (Aboody 
et al., 2004, p. 132). These firms do not want to draw more attention and this in turn affects the 
contracts they write.  Thus, corporations that want to stay out of the limelight because of high 
income may continue using ESOs, using the amendment to Section 3870 to decrease their net 
income. 
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However, Darrough and Li (2006) found that politically visible firms reduced ESO use 
more in the post Enron era because investors learned that top executives had continued to make 
millions of dollars by cashing in ESOs while shareholders lost the bulk of their investments 
(Brown & Lee, 2007, p. 16). The political environment turned hostile towards firms using ESOs. 
Dechow, Hutton, and Sloan (1996) also argue that managers with significant option portfolios 
want to reduce the visibility of excess compensation and attempt to reduce the political costs 
associated with reporting high compensation expense and therefore will want to reduce ESO use 
in the post amendment period since ESOs can no longer hide compensation expense.  
This leads to two competing possibilities regarding the effects of the amendment to 
Section 3870: will firms use the amendment to Section 3870 and continue to use ESOs to reduce 
net income, or will they use ESOs less to reduce political scrutiny associated with ESO use? 
Because of these conflicting motivations, it is difficult to predict what politically visible firms 
will do. To parallel Brown and Lee (2007), the second explanation regarding ESO use decreasing 
as a means of reducing a firms’ political scrutiny is preferred, and Hypothesis 5 is proposed: 
 
H5: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management for corporations 
that are more visible politically has decreased more since the amendment to Section 3870 
has gone into effect. 
 
 
 
Pay for Performance: Growth Opportunities 
Having an efficient securities market means that all available information is reflected in 
the share price. In the late nineties, options were considered by the market to be a symbol of a 
firm's financial success (Seethamraju & Zach, 2003, p. 5). For example, start-up high-tech firms 
and firms with intensive research and development programs preferred the use of ESOs because 
short-term options allowed managers to benefit from stock price appreciation. The market price 
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captured these firms’ potential growth opportunities and was a better measure of success for these 
firms. Chourou, Abaoub, and Saadi (2008), state that “firms experiencing high growth 
opportunities should offer more stock-based compensation to their CEOs” (p. 63). Executives 
were able to generate large compensation benefits through the use of ESOs because of the strong 
bull market during the nineties and the years 2003 through 2008. Hypothesis Six follows from 
this discussion and states: 
 
H6: The proportion of compensation from ESOs for senior management for corporations 
with greater growth opportunities has decreased less since the amendment to Section 
3870 has gone into effect. 
 
The next section focuses on understanding the changes in compensation structure and the 
results of those changes. 
Changes to Management Compensation Design Associated  
With the Amendment to Section 3870  
Hall and Murphy (2002) find that “options are, in fact, an unusually expensive and 
therefore inefficient way to convey compensation to executives,” (p. 16). Firms can motivate 
risk-averse executives through less risky compensation alternatives and “the economic cost to the 
shareholders of granting options often far exceeds the value that employee-recipients place on the 
options,” (Hall & Murphy, 2002, p. 16). Therefore, if the amendment to Section 3870 improved 
contracting efficiency by reducing use of ESOs, overall compensation costs should decrease 
subsequent to the amendment. An additional component of this study therefore examines how 
firms restructured compensation packages after the amendment to Section 3870.  
Two major aspects of compensation alternatives have been identified that affect their use 
in compensation packages: financial reporting and accounting differences, and risk differences.  
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Financial Reporting/Accounting Implications 
One prediction, similar to Brown and Lee (2007) is that firms choose among 
compensation alternatives based on how compensation is reported in the financial statements. 
Stock-based compensation plans (ESOs, SARS, PSUs and RSUs) may be settled in shares or 
cash, and the accounting for these plans in Canada differs depending on the method of settlement 
but is no better or worse from the firm’s perspective.  
Typically, ESOs are settled in shares. As noted earlier, prior to the amendment to Section 
3870, ESOs did not need to be expensed, making their accounting treatment more attractive to 
firms relative to other forms of compensation. After the amendment, ESOs are valued using an 
option pricing model (e.g. the Black-Scholes method).  The inputs to option pricing models can 
be difficult to estimate. For example, “three of the variables (expected volatility, expected 
dividend yield, and expected term of the option) … require subjective assessment of the future,” 
(Hagopian, 2006, p. 152) and adjustment of any of these variables can have a dramatic effect on 
the price of the option. This estimated expense is allocated over the vesting period. For example, 
most organizations use a four year vesting period and therefore this expense is recognized over a 
four year period. The post-amendment accounting treatment for ESOs affects income and thus 
owner’s equity, with no adjustment for changes in value of the underlying shares at each balance 
sheet date.  
On the other hand, stock-based compensation when settled in cash (e.g. PSUs, RSUs and 
SARs) is valued using the intrinsic method. This means that compensation is measured at the 
market value on the date of issue (number of shares granted multiplied by market value) and thus 
requires no estimation. This expense is allocated over the service period (the period in which the 
employee performs the service, which is usually the same as the vesting period) and is adjusted at 
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each balance sheet date to reflect the current market price of the shares. The accounting treatment 
for plans settled in cash affects liabilities.  
The major differences between the two types of settlement are thus: the valuation method, 
the need for adjustments made over the vesting/service period and which accounts are affected. In 
a period of rising prices (which was the case over my sample period), stock-based compensation 
settled in shares may be preferred over stock-based compensation settled in cash because 
adjustments are not required and will therefore not subsequently decrease net income.   
Risk 
Performance based incentives are used to align shareholder and manager goals. One 
caveat is that these plans impose risk on the executive, who are generally assumed to be risk 
averse. Risk-averse executives prefer compensation contracts that are not contingent on firm 
performance. Risk-averse executive’s value options lower than the company could sell the 
options on the market because the executive cannot usually sell the option or hedge against its 
risk. “Executives receiving options will therefore value the options below their cost to 
shareholders, and this differential must be weighed against the incentive benefits in determining 
the optimal level of stock option compensation,” (Hall & Murphy, 2002, p. 5). Research suggests 
that other types of stock-based compensation are less risky and therefore fewer non-ESO type 
options need to be provided. For example, Brown and Lee (2007) find that “that a one-dollar 
decrease in ESOs is associated with a 35-cent increase in restricted stock,” (p. 25).  In addition, 
Hall and Murphy (2002) argue from a theoretical perspective that, “when efficient bargaining is 
allowed, restricted stock is relatively cheap (because executives value it more highly than options 
and therefore are willing to take a larger cut in cash pay),” (p. 27). Hall and Murphy (2002) 
determine that an executive will be indifferent between receiving $300,000 in cash, $375,000 in 
restricted stock (RSUs), and $500,000 in options issued at fair market value (ESOs) (p. 16). This 
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ordering is based upon keeping the executive at the same level of expected utility, (Hall & 
Murphy, 2002, p. 16).  
Thus, pre-amendment, the lack of cash needed for ESOs combined with their favorable 
accounting treatment made them preferable from the firm's perspective to RSUs, but riskier from 
the manager's perspective. RSUs would therefore have been less willingly substituted for ESOs 
by the firm despite managers' preferences, and so the substitution rate would have been more 
unequal than in the post-amendment period. In a market with increasing prices, ESOs may still be 
the preferred form of stock-based compensation; however, with the loss of accounting advantage 
for the firm after the 3870 amendment, firms should have a greater willingness to substitute 
RSUs in place of ESOs in the post-amendment period, all else equal. H7a and b therefore predict 
the following inequalities for replacing ESOs with RSUs in the pre- and post-amendment 
periods: 
 
H7a: In the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period, the substitution rate for ESOs and 
RSUs is unequal, with RSU substituted at less than a dollar for dollar basis for ESOs.
2
  
 
H7b: In the post-amendment to Section 3870 period, the substitution rate of RSUs to 
ESOs is less unequal than in the pre-amendment period, and closer to the theoretical 
substitution rate suggested by Hall and Murphy.  
 
Improvements in Pay for Performance Associated  
with the Changes in Compensation Design 
The desire to include compensation based on share price to better align manager and 
shareholder interests was one reason (previously mentioned) for the increase in the use of ESOs 
in executive compensation. In support of the theory on this issue, Hall and Liebman (1998) find a 
strong relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance. Their research suggests 
that this strong relationship is due in particular to ESOs and stock-based compensation, (p. 653). 
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Hall and Liebman’s (1998) study supports the use of ESOs to align owner and manager goals. 
Their results imply that compensation contracts need to include stock and ESOs to increase pay-
for-performance sensitivities and “the relationship between pay and performance is almost 
entirely driven by changes in the value of stock and stock options,” (Hall & Liebman, 1998, p. 
685). ESOs were viewed as an effective component in compensation contracts relative to cash 
because, “the incentive effects of salary and bonus changes are 53 times smaller than those from 
stock and stock option revaluations,” (Hall & Liebman, 1998, p. 682). In this study, I consider the 
incentive effects of other forms of stock-based compensation and whether these other types of 
stock-based compensation provide similar pay-for-performance incentives as ESOs.    
Although ESO use has apparently created a stronger pay for performance link, senior 
management compensation has been said to be abnormally high as a result. Brown and Lee 
(2007) find that “…ESO use is associated with abnormally high executive compensation,” (p. 
30).  As previously mentioned, the excessive use of ESOs may be due to the preferential 
accounting treatment prior to the amendment to Section 3870. The amendment should force 
companies to reconsider their compensation packages and as a result, reduce ESO use for senior 
management. It is predicted above that this decrease is off-set by an increase in other types of 
stock-based compensation, but as noted earlier, the substitution of other stock-based 
compensation should be less than a dollar per dollar reduction in ESOs. 
Therefore, reducing ESO use while simultaneously increasing other types of stock-based 
compensation, but at a less than dollar for dollar substitution rate, should result in an overall 
decrease in total compensation (controlling for economic determinants). If the same level of 
motivation is provided by other forms of stock-based compensation to senior management teams, 
then the final hypothesis is: 
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H8: The pay-performance sensitivity for total compensation for senior management has 
improved since the amendment to Section 3870.  
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Method and Results 
Sample Selection 
The sample for this study was determined by the Financial Post ranking of the top 500 
largest Canadian Corporations by revenue (FP 500, 2008). This list also included an additional 
300 Canadian corporations for a total of 800. Starting at the top of the Financial Post ranking, 
each firm was looked up on SEDAR - the System for Electronic Document Analysis and 
Retrieval - (Sedar, n.d.) to ensure that the firm had both financial statement and proxy data 
available for the sample period. Initially, the first 200 publicly listed corporations that had data 
available on SEDAR for at least two years from the pre-Section 3870 period (2000 – 2002) and at 
least two years from the post-Section 3870 period (2004 – 2006) and used Canadian Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, (GAAP) were included in the sample.
3
 After these 200 firms 
were collected, it was decided that an additional eleven firms be collected in case the banks and 
financial institutions were deemed to have too much influence on the data.
4
 This resulted in a 
total of 211 firms that had data for the sample period. An additional 31 firms were then 
eliminated as they did not use ESOs at all during the sample period, and an additional 5 firms 
were eliminated because market returns data was not available for them. Therefore 175 firms are 
used in Model 1 (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1 
 
Model 1 Sample Selection and Criteria 
 
Description Size 
Initial sample 200 
Additional firms collected 11 
Firms not using ESOs as part of compensation for 2000-2006 31 
Firms missing market return data 5 
Firms included in the sample using ESOs 175 
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Data Sources 
As previously mentioned the governance and compensation data for this study was hand 
collected. Below is a description of the data sources used to find all relevant information.  
Compensation and Governance Data 
The data for senior management compensation
5
 (previously defined as the top 5 
executives) and governance variables were hand collected from the proxy statements filed on 
SEDAR. SEDAR is the system in Canada used for electronically filing securities related 
information and is now mandatory for most reporting issuers in Canada, (Sedar, n.d.). All senior 
management compensation components are reported in dollars in the proxy statements except 
ESOs, which are valued using the Black-Scholes-Merton valuation method (see Appendix A for 
the formula). Any data disclosed in US dollars was converted to Canadian dollars at an average 
exchange rate for that firms’ fiscal year (Bank of Canada, 2008). Senior management 
compensation data for fiscal years between January 2000 and December 2006 were collected.  
Financial Statement Data 
Financial statement data that was required for this study was collected from 
FPInfomart.ca (FPInfomart, 2008). FPInfomart.ca is Canada's largest provider of financial and 
corporate data. All data collected from FPInfomart are disclosed in Canadian dollars. Any 
financial statement data that was not available on FPInfomart.ca was hand collected directly from 
that firm’s financial statements on SEDAR. Finally if the data was not available on either of the 
above, Research Insight was used. 
Return Data 
Market returns information was collected using the Canadian Financial Markets Research 
Center (CFMRC) Summary Information Database or Research Insight if the data was not 
available from CFMRC.  
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Industry Structure of Sample 
The number of firms per year in the sample by industry category is provided in Table 2. 
In this study, year is defined as the year covering the final month of the fiscal year chosen by the 
firm. For example a fiscal year from May 2000 to April 2001 is treated as an observation for the 
year 2001. Most firms in the sample had a fiscal year end of December 31.  
Since the Exposure Draft was released on January 1, 2003, firms were aware of the 
impending change of Section 3870 and had the ability to begin changing their compensation 
plans before the amendment to Section 3870 was actually passed. As a result, it was difficult to 
classify the year 2003 as pre or post-Section 3870, and therefore the year 2003 was excluded 
from the data employed in all models, and in Table Two.  
The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) was used at the two-digit 
level to define the industry categories. Overall, there were 20 NAICS industries, with 1,250 firm 
year observations. The largest two industries are mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 
(20.08%) and primary metal manufacturing (14.24%). Finance and insurance (12.24%) and wood 
product manufacturing (9.60%) make up the next largest industries in the sample. This is 
comparable to Zhou’s Canadian sample (2000) industry structure where his two largest industries 
were resources (29.5%) followed by financial industries (21.5%). It is clear when comparing to 
Brown and Lee (2007, p. 44) - whose largest industry is Aerospace and Defense (11.1%) and 
second largest industry is Communications Equipment (9.4%) – that the Canadian business 
landscape is quite different. 
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Table 2 
 
Sample Size by NAICS Industry and Year 
 
Industry 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 
Number of 
observations 
% of 
firms in 
each 
industry 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting 
6 6 6 6 6 6 36 2.88% 
Mining, quarrying 
and oil and gas 
extraction 
42 42 42 42 42 41 251 20.08% 
Utilities 4 5 5 5 5 5 29 2.32% 
Construction 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 2.40% 
Manufacturing 10 10 10 10 10 10 60 4.80% 
Wood product 
manufacturing 
20 20 20 20 20 20 120 9.60% 
Primary metal 
manufacturing 
28 30 30 30 30 30 178 14.24% 
Wholesale trade 5 5 5 5 5 5 30 2.40% 
Retail trade 10 10 10 10 10 10 60 4.80% 
Sporting goods, 
hobby, book and 
music stores 
4 4 4 4 4 4 24 1.92% 
Transportation and 
warehousing 
7 7 7 7 7 7 42 3.36% 
Information 16 16 16 16 16 15 95 7.60% 
Finance and 
Insurance 
26 25 25 26 26 25 153 12.24% 
Real estate and rental 
leasing 
8 8 8 8 8 8 48 3.84% 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical services 
3 3 3 3 3 3 18 1.44% 
Management of 
companies and 
enterprises 
2 2 2 2 2 2 12 0.96% 
Administrative and 
support and waste 
management 
7 7 7 7 7 7 42 3.36% 
Arts and 
entertainment and 
recreation 
1 1 1 1 1 1 6 0.48% 
Accommodation and 
food services 
1 1 1 1 1 0 5 0.40% 
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Industry 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 
Number of 
observations 
% of 
firms in 
each 
industry 
Other Services 2 2 2 2 2 1 11 0.88% 
Total N per year
6
 207 209 209 210 210 205 1,250 100.00% 
 
ESO usage by Industry 
Columns Two and Three in Table 3 present the mean and median values respectively of 
ESOs as a proportion of total compensation (ESO%) by industry. Arts and entertainment and 
recreation appear to have the highest ESO% with a mean (median) of 32.06% (33.95%). The 
information industry has the second highest ESO% of 28.00% (25.11%). Wholesale trade has an 
ESO% of 25.98% (18.71%) followed closely by mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction 
with a mean (median) of 25.93% (22.59%). Firms in the utilities industry have the least ESO% at 
6.29% (4.56%). There is an apparent right skewness of the underlying distribution of ESO use for 
many industries in Table 3 which accounts for the difference between the mean and median. 
Columns Four and Five show the mean ESO% in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 and 
in the post-amendment to Section 3870 periods respectively. The information industry was the 
largest user of ESOs in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period (34.38%) followed by the 
mining, quarrying and oil and gas extraction sector (30.60%). The arts and entertainment and 
recreation sector continued to increase their ESO use in the post-amendment to Section 3870 
period (35.07%) and the second largest users of ESOs in the post-amendment period was the 
wholesale trade industry (24.45%). It appears that all but four industries reduced ESO use. The 
accommodation and food services industry moved away from any ESO use and the firm with the 
next largest change in ESO use was the professional, scientific and technical services industry.    
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Table 3 
 
ESO% Mean per industry, pooled, Pre- and Post-Section 3870 
 
(1) 
Industry (N) 
(2) 
Aggregate 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% 
(3) 
Aggregate 
Median 
Industry 
ESO% 
(4) 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% Pre-
Section 3870 
(5) 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% Post-
Section 3870 
(6) 
% 
Change 
(Pre and 
Post) 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing and hunting 
(36) 
19.61% 5.14% 26.07% 13.14% -49.60% 
Mining, quarrying 
and oil and gas 
extraction (251) 
25.93% 22.59% 30.60% 21.21% -30.69% 
Utilities (29) 6.29% 4.56% 6.09% 6.47% 6.24% 
Construction (30) 9.90% 0.00% 11.60% 8.20% -29.31% 
Manufacturing (60) 13.53% 2.95% 17.24% 9.82% -43.04% 
Wood product  
manufacturing (120) 
24.24% 22.54% 28.63% 19.85% -30.67% 
Primary metal 
manufacturing (178) 
16.98% 9.38% 21.94% 12.13% -44.71% 
Wholesale trade (30) 25.98% 18.71% 27.50% 24.45% -11.09% 
Retail trade (60) 11.74% 0.00% 11.65% 11.83% 1.55% 
Sporting goods, 
hobby, book and 
music stores (24) 
10.48% 1.78% 12.40% 8.56% -30.97% 
Transportation and 
warehousing (42) 
19.58% 15.35% 17.06% 22.10% 29.54% 
Information (95) 28.00% 25.11% 34.38% 21.48% -37.52% 
Finance and 
Insurance (153) 
14.42% 9.21% 19.02% 9.88% -48.05% 
Real estate and rental 
leasing (48) 
17.02% 1.17% 22.51% 11.54% -48.73% 
Professional, 
scientific and 
technical services 
(48) 
11.59% 2.99% 19.25% 3.93% -79.58% 
Management of 
companies and 
enterprises (12) 
22.25% 0.00% 23.16% 21.34% -7.86% 
Administrative and 
support and waste 
management (42) 
 
 
20.74% 15.01% 26.76% 14.72% -44.99% 
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(1) 
Industry (N) 
(2) 
Aggregate 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% 
(3) 
Aggregate 
Median 
Industry 
ESO% 
(4) 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% Pre-
Section 3870 
(5) 
Mean 
Industry 
ESO% Post-
Section 3870 
(6) 
% 
Change 
(Pre and 
Post) 
Arts and 
entertainment and 
recreation (6) 
32.06% 33.95% 29.05% 35.07% 20.72% 
Accommodation and 
food services (5) 
10.45% 0.00% 17.42% 0.00% -100.00% 
Other Services (11) 19.71% 14.78% 21.13% 18.00% -14.81% 
Aggregate Average 19.59% 13.12% 23.67% 15.50% -34.52% 
 
Hypothesis 1a 
A comparison-of-means test for each of the various forms of senior management 
compensation was conducted first. Senior management compensation usually consists of salary, 
bonus, other annual (Misc.) compensation, ESOs (including SARs), other stock-based 
compensation (PSUs, RSUs), long term incentive plans and all other annual compensation. These 
items are included in total compensation and the definitions for these components defined by the 
Ontario Securities Commission in Form 51-102F6 Statement of Executive Compensation 
(Ontario Securities Commission, 2008) can be found in Table 4.  
A key part of the research design requires assigning compensation to the pre and post 
3870 amendment periods.  A proxy statement issued in the calendar year following the firm’s 
year-end discussed information pertaining to that fiscal year, and was labeled as compensation 
for that fiscal year. For example, a proxy statement issued in April 2004 would have described 
compensation for the fiscal year-end December 31, 2003 (although it may have been paid in early 
2004) and was labeled as compensation for the year 2003. 
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Table 4 
Executive Compensation Components – Total Compensation 
Type Description 
Salary Any cash or non-cash base salary. For non-cash compensation, disclose the 
fair market value of the compensation at the time the compensation is 
earned. 
Bonus Any cash or non-cash bonus. 
Other annual 
(Misc.) 
compensation 
Perquisites and other personal benefits, securities or property unless the 
aggregate amount of such compensation is less than $50,000 and 10 per cent 
of the total of the annual salary and bonus for the financial year. A perquisite 
is the cost or value of a personal benefit provided to the senior manager that 
is not avail able to all employees. Examples: car allowance, car lease, cars, 
corporate aircraft, club membership, financial assistance to provide 
education to children of the executive, financial counseling, parking and tax 
return preparation; The above-market portion of all interest, dividends or 
other amounts paid concerning securities, options, SARs, loans, deferred 
compensation or other obligations issued; Earnings on LTIP compensation or 
dividend equivalents paid during the financial year or payable during that 
period but deferred at the election of the executive; Amounts reimbursed 
during the financial year for the payment of taxes; The difference between 
the price paid by an executive for a security of your company or its 
subsidiaries that was purchased from the company or its subsidiaries and the 
fair market value of the security at the time of purchase; The imputed interest 
benefits from loans provided to, or debts incurred on behalf of, the executive 
by the company and its subsidiaries as computed in accordance with the 
Income Tax Act (Canada); and The amounts of loan or interest obligations of 
the executive to the company, its subsidiaries or third parties that were 
serviced or settled by the company or its subsidiaries without the substitution 
of an obligation to repay the amount to the company or subsidiaries in its 
place.  
Securities under 
options granted / 
SARs granted 
ESOs (valued using 
the Black-Scholes 
method – see 
Appendix A) 
Options include all options, share purchase 
warrants and rights granted by a company or its 
subsidiaries as compensation for employment 
services or office.  
Stock appreciation 
rights (SARs) 
Means a right, granted by a company or any of its 
subsidiaries as compensation for employment 
services or office to receive cash or an issue or 
transfer of securities based wholly or in part on 
changes in the trading price of publicly traded 
securities. 
Shares or Units 
subject to Resale 
Restrictions 
(RSUs) 
The dollar value of any shares or units that are subject to restrictions on 
resale (calculated by multiplying the closing market price of your company’s 
freely trading shares on the date of grant by the number of stock or stock 
units awarded). 
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Type Description 
Performance 
Share Units  
(PSUs) 
The dollar value of any shares or units that are subject to performance 
restrictions as determined by the individual firm (calculated as the number of 
options or shares to which all employees receiving the award will be entitled 
by the exercise price) 
Long-term 
incentive plan 
A plan providing compensation intended to motivate performance over a 
period greater than one financial year. LTIPs do not include option or SAR 
plans or plans for compensation through shares or units that are subject to 
restrictions or resale. Awards of shares or units that are subject to restrictions 
on resale that are subject to performance-based conditions prior to vesting 
may be disclosed as LTIP under the table instead of under shares or units 
subject to resale restrictions. 
Pension All compensation relating to defined benefit or defined contribution plans. 
These include service costs and other compensatory items such as plan 
changes and earnings that are different from the estimated earnings for 
defined benefit plans above-market earnings for defined contribution plans 
All other 
compensation 
The amount paid, payable or accrued to an executive for the resignation, 
retirement or other termination of the executive’s employment with the 
company, or a change in control of the company or one of its subsidiaries; 
the dollar value of the above-market portion of all interest, dividends or other 
amounts earned during the financial year, or calculated with respect to that 
period; the dollar amounts earned on LTIP compensation during the financial 
year, or calculated with respect to that period and dividend equivalents 
earned during that period except amounts recorded in other annual 
compensation column; annual contributions or other allocations by the 
company or its subsidiaries to vested and unvested defined contribution plans 
or employee savings plans; the dollar value of any insurance premium paid 
by, or on behalf of the company during the financial year with respect to 
term life insurance; and any form of a contribution to assist the executive’s 
purchase of shares, unless the contribution was available to all security 
holders or to all salaried employees of the company. 
 
Hypothesis H1a predicts a cutback in ESO use after the amendment to Section 3870, and 
a simple test of means is used to determine if the hypothesis is supported. Table 5 provides means 
and medians of the top five managers' total compensation and each of its components as a 
proportion of total compensation pre-and post-Section 3870, to help place the change in ESOs in 
context.  
The mean and median total compensation for senior management significantly increased 
from the pre-Section 3870 period to the post-Section 3870 period (p < 0.0001).  The mean 
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(median) salary as a percent of total compensation decreased significantly (p < 0.0001) from 
44.10% (41.54%) to 37.20% (35.78%). The mean (median) bonus as a percent of total 
compensation increased significantly (p < 0.0001) from 21.14% (18.68%) to 26.02% (24.03%). 
These results are consistent with Brown and Lee (2007, p. 20) who found a decrease in mean 
salary from 31% to 29% and an increase in mean bonus from 16% to 20%. Similar to Brown and 
Lee (2007) was the increase in mean RSUs (1.47% to 5.56%) and mean increase in LTIP (1.96% 
to 3.21%). Brown and Lee (2007) found mean increases in RSUs (6.39% to 13.56%) and mean 
LTIP (2.33% to 4.27%). Canadian firms seem to rely more on bonuses than the use of share-
based compensation.  
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Table 5 
 
Comparison of Means and medians of total executive compensation and its components pre-
amendment and post-amendment to Section 3870 
(1) 
(2) 
Pre-Section 3870 (2000-
2002) 
 
(3) 
Post-Section 3870 
(2004-2006) 
(4) 
Aggregate Sample 
(excluding 2003) 
(2000-2006) 
(5) 
Two-
Sample 
paired t-
test (2 vs. 
3) 
 
Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev Mean Median 
Std. 
Dev 
(Wilcoxon 
two-
sample 
test) 
Total 
compensation 
to top five 
executives 
(millions of 
dollars) 
6.533 3.359 9.164 8.090 5.379 8.304 7.312 4.371 8.775 
<0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
Salary % 44.10% 41.54% 23.00% 37.20% 35.78% 18.94% 40.65% 38.10% 21.34% <0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
Bonus % 21.14% 18.68% 17.27% 26.02% 24.03% 16.96% 23.58% 21.80% 17.28% <0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
Misc comp. 
% 
2.45% 0.19% 4.79% 2.59% 0.56% 4.89% 2.52% 0.35% 
 
4.84% 0.30 
(0.21) 
ESO % 23.67% 18.59% 24.50% 15.50% 10.05% 18.26% 19.59% 13.12% 21.98% <0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
SAR % 0.57% 0.00% 3.99% 1.41% 0.00% 6.87% 0.99% 0.00% 5.63% 0.0059 
(0.02) 
RSU % 1.47% 0.00% 5.87% 5.56% 0.00% 12.03% 3.52% 0.00% 9.68% <0.0001 
(<0.0001) 
PSU % 0.02% 0.00% 0.59% 1.10% 0.00% 5.41% 0.56% 0.00% 3.89% 0.0004 
(<0.0001) 
LTIP % 1.96% 0.00% 7.61% 3.21% 0.00% 9.37% 2.58% 0.00% 8.55% <0.0001 
(0.00) 
Pension % 0.02% 0.00% 0.28% 0.84% 0.00% 0.59% 0.05% 0.00% 0.46% 0.00475 
(0.00) 
All other 
comp % 
3.93% 0.37% 8.51% 5.83% 1.30% 10.69% 4.89% 0.83% 9.70% 0.01 
(<0.0001) 
 
Also consistent with Brown and Lee (2007), was the significant decrease (p < 0.0001) in 
ESO use. The mean (median) value of ESOs as a percent of total compensation declined from 
23.67% (18.59%) to 15.5% (10.05%). These findings support H1a which predicted a decrease in 
ESO use since the implementation of Section 3870. Brown and Lee (2007, p. 20) found the mean 
(median) ESO use declined from 38% (37%) to 27% (24%). Compared to Brown and Lee’s 
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(2007) U.S. sample, overall this Canadian sample used options less and also decreased the use of 
ESOs less than their U.S. counterparts.  
Table 6 below shows the changes over time surrounding the amendment to Section 3870. 
This analysis was conducted to determine if the change in senior management compensation was 
associated in time with the amendment rather than being part of general time trends. Table 6 
shows that the greatest change in mean and median ESO use occurs in the year the exposure draft 
for the amendment to Section 3870 was introduced and adopted - 2003. Table 6 also shows that 
there was another weakly significant mean reduction in the use of ESOs (while the change was 
not significant for the median) after the passage of the amendment in 2004, although the change 
is much smaller than the reaction to the Exposure Draft.  
Table 6 
 
Change in ESO% per year 
 
Year 
Median ESO% 
Year t-1 -   Year t 
Wilcoxon Two-
sample test 
statistic 
Mean ESO% 
Year t-1 -   Year t 
t-Statistic from a 
Two-sample 
paired t-test 
2000 – 2001 0.16 – 0.18 42868.50 0.23 – 0.23 -0.03 
2001 – 2002 0.18 – 0.20 43248.50 0.23 – 0.24 -0.54 
2002 – 2003 0.20 – 0.12 46921.50*** 0.24 – 0.18 3.36**** 
2003 – 2004 0.12 – 0.10 45050.50 0.18 – 0.17 0.86 
2004 – 2005 0.10 – 0.12 44666.50 0.17 – 0.16 1.15* 
2005 – 2006 0.12 – 0.09 42031.00 0.16 – 0.15 0.53 
2006 – 2007 0.09 – 0.09 37764.00 0.15 – 0.14 0.59 
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed.  ***p < .01, two-tailed. ****p < .001, two-tailed. 
Hypothesis 1b 
As shown in Table 5 above, there is support for H1b, which predicts an increase in the use 
of other types of stock based compensation after the amendment to Section 3870. SARs as a 
percentage of total compensation increased, with its mean (median) value going from 0.57% 
(0.00%) in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period to 1.41% (0.00) in the post-amendment to 
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Section 3870 period (p = 0.00). RSUs as a percentage of total compensation also increased 
significantly (p < 0.0001) with its mean (median) value increasing from 1.47% (0.00%) in the 
pre-amendment to Section 3870 period to 5.56% (0.00%) in the post-amendment to Section 3870 
period. Finally, PSUs as a percentage of total compensation increased (p = 0.0002) with its mean 
(median) value increasing from 0.024% (0.00%) in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period to 
0.592% (0.00%) in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period. One unexpected finding was the 
significant increase in bonus-based compensation. This finding suggests that some ESOs may 
have been replaced with bonuses rather than non-ESO stock-based compensation. 
Table 7 shows the percentages of firms that use the various forms of stock-based 
compensation to help understand the findings in Table 6. Sixty-one percent of firms continue to 
use ESOs in 2006, down from 66% in 2002. The percentage of firms using SARs has increased 
overall from 2000 to 2006 (4.83%) although they decreased to just two percent in 2002, but rose 
to 8.29% in 2006. RSUs also had a steady increase over the years with just over 32% of firms 
using this type of stock-based compensation in 2006. Finally PSUs went from zero firms using 
PSUs in 2000 to almost 7% of firms in 2006. On a univariate level, it is clear that the use of 
alternative types of stock-based compensation has increased both as a mean and in the proportion 
of firms using alternative forms, while the use of ESOs has decreased. However, more than 60% 
of the sample firms are still using ESOs to reward their top executives, and it is still the dominant 
form of share based compensation. In summary, these findings suggest that some firms were 
using ESOs for earnings management purposes. However the dominant use of ESOs both as a 
proportion of compensation (15.50%) and in terms of the number of firms using ESOs (61.00%) 
after the amendment to Section 3870 suggests that pay for performance considerations may be 
more important in determining ESO use. Hypotheses Two through Six explore the relative 
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importance of the factors associated with the two possible reasons for ESO use and are discussed 
next.  
Table 7 
Percentage of firms using the various forms of stock-based compensation 
 
 2000 2001 2002 2004 2005 2006 
ESOs 65.70% 68.90% 69.86% 60.48% 61.43% 61.00% 
SARs 4.83% 6.22% 1.91% 8.10% 5.71% 8.29% 
RSUs 8.70% 7.66% 11.00% 18.57% 24.76% 32.20% 
PSUs 0.00% 0.00% 0.48% 2.38% 4.29% 6.83% 
 
Hypotheses Two – Six  
Models and Variables
7
 
Model 1 has been closely modeled after Brown and Lee (2007) to test hypotheses H2 to H6 - 
the determinants of ESO cutbacks at a multivariate level. Any variables that have not been 
included in Model 1 that were included in Brown and Lee's version are due to lack of availability 
of the required data in Canadian financial statements. For example, IMPACT is “measured as the 
pro forma ESO expense disclosed in the SFAS 123 footnote scaled by the market value of equity 
at the end of the fiscal year…” (Brown & Lee, 2007, p. 15). In Canada pro forma disclosure of 
ESO expense was only required for the years 2002 and 2003, and so is not available over the 
entire sample period. Model 1 is presented below: 
(1) CHG_ESO% = β0 + β1 Governance Variablespre + β2 EPS_INCpre + β3 EPS_POSpre  
+ β4 LEVERAGEpre + β5 INT_COVpre + β6 ISSUE_DEBTpre + β7ln_SIZEpre                          
+ β8TOP5%pre + β9BMpre + β10CUM_RETpre + β11CHG_SALES + β12CHG_ROA 
+ β13CHG_CASH_CONSTR + β14CHG_NOL + β15CHG_DIVCON  
+ ∑ Industry Dummies + ε 
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 Table 8 summarizes Model 1 and provides sign predictions, descriptions, calculations, 
database sources, and the study from which the variable is derived, in addition to their role in 
each hypothesis. 
Table 8 
Table of Variables for Model 1 
Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
D.V. CHG_ESO% - H2 – H6 ESO use is 
defined as the 
proportion of the 
total 
compensation to 
senior 
management 
(top 5 
executives) paid 
in options 
(ESO%). ESO 
changes are 
measured as the 
difference in the 
ESO% between 
the post-
amendment to 
Section 3870 
period (2004 – 
2006) and the 
pre-Amendment 
period (2000 – 
2002). 
Black – 
Scholes value 
of ESOs / total 
compensation 
(Avg. Post- 
amendment 
minus Avg. 
Pre- 
amendment) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEOCHAIR - H2 an indicator 
variable equal to 
one if the board 
chair is the 
firm’s CEO and 
zero otherwise 
for 2001 
1 or 0 Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core, 
Holthausen 
and 
Larker, 
1999 
BOARDSIZE - H2 total number of 
board directors 
for 2001 divided 
by 100 
 Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
INSIDEDIR - H2 percent of total 
directors 
classified as 
“non-
independent” for 
2001 
 
 
 
# of Non 
independent 
directors / 
total directors 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
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Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
BUSYDIR - H2 Number of 
“independent” 
directors who 
serve on three or 
more other 
boards, scaled 
by the number of 
outside directors 
for 2001 
# independent 
directors 
sitting on 3 or 
more boards / 
total outside 
directors 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
CEOHOLDING + H2 percent of 
outstanding 
shares owned by 
the CEO 
(including shares 
owned by 
spouses) for 
2001 
o/s shares 
owned by 
CEO / shares 
o/s 
 
 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
NONCEOOWN - H2 indicator 
variable set 
equal to zero if 
at least one non-
independent 
board member 
other than the 
CEO owns 5% 
or more of the 
outstanding 
shares and one 
otherwise for 
2001  
1 or 0  
# o/s shares 
owned by 
non-
independent 
director / total 
shares o/s 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
OUTDIROWN + H2 percent of 
outstanding 
shares owned by 
independent 
directors divided 
by the number of 
independent 
directors for 
2001 
Total shares 
owned by 
independent 
directors / # 
independent 
directors 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
 OUTOWN - H2 indicator 
variable equal to 
zero if the firm 
has an external 
block holder 
who owns at 
least 5% of the 
outstanding 
shares, and one 
otherwise for 
2001 
1 or 0  Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Core et al., 
1999 
B_MEETINGS + H2 number of board 
meetings held 
over the year 
2001 divided by 
100 
# of board 
meetings / 100 
Proxy Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
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Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
CS20 - H2 CS20 is an 
indicator 
variable that is 
equal to zero if 
the firm is 
closely held 
(owns 20% or 
more) and one 
otherwise for 
2001 
1 or 0 Proxy Park et al., 
2001 
Earnings 
Benchmarks 
EPS_INC - H3 the proportion of 
years that the 
firm’s EPS was 
equal to or 
greater than the 
prior year in the 
pre period 
(2000-2002) 
EPSt > = EPSt-
1 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
EPS_POS - H3 the proportion of 
years in the pre-
amendment 
period (2000-
2002) that the 
firm reported 
positive EPS 
EPS > = 0 FPInfomart 
and/or F/S  
 
Debt 
Covenants 
LEVERAGE - H4 the ratio of long-
term debt to 
equity averaged 
over the pre 
period 
Long term 
debt / total 
equity (pre-
period 
average) 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Scott, 
2006 
 INT_COV - H4 earnings before 
interest and 
taxes divided by 
total interest (as 
defined and 
calculated by 
FPInfomart) 
averaged over 
the pre period 
(/100) 
EBIT / total 
interest (pre-
period 
average)/100 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Scott, 
2006 
ISSUE_DEBT - H4 Indicator 
variable equal to 
1 if the firm 
issued debt in 
the pre-period 
and 0 if they did 
not issue debt in 
the pre-period 
1 or 0 Research 
Insight 
(RI) 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
Political 
Costs 
ln_SIZE 
 
 
- H5 the natural 
logarithm of the 
market value of 
equity averaged 
over the pre-
period (/100) 
 
Log of Market 
value of 
equity (pre-
period 
average)/100 
CFMRC/ 
TSE/ RI 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
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Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
TOP5% - H5 number of 
options granted 
to the top five 
executives as a 
percent of total 
options granted 
to all employees 
averaged over 
the pre-period 
Total options 
granted to 
senior mgt. / 
total options 
granted (pre-
period 
average) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
Growth 
Opportunities 
BM -  The end of year 
book value of 
equity divided 
by the end of 
year market 
value of equity 
averaged in the 
pre-period 
Year-end 
book value of 
equity / year-
end market 
value of 
equity(average 
pre-period) 
 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
CFMRC 
and RI 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
Economic 
Determinants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CUM_RET + H6 Annualized rates 
of return 
reflecting 
monthly price 
appreciation plus 
reinvestment of 
monthly 
dividends and 
the 
compounding 
effect of 
dividends paid 
on reinvested 
dividends. The 3 
Year Indexed 
Total Return 
concept is a 
monthly indexed 
value that 
reflects the 
percentage 
change of the 
value 36 months 
previous 
Stock return  Research 
Insight 
(RI) 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
CHG_lnSALES +  The average 
logarithm of 
sales in the post-
period subtract 
the average 
logarithm of 
sales in the pre-
period 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Logarithm of 
Sales (average 
post-period – 
average pre-
period) 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
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Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHG_ROA +  The average 
post-period 
accounting 
return on assets 
minus the 
average pre-
period 
accounting 
return on assets ( 
as defined and 
calculated by 
FPInfomart)(/10) 
EBIT / total 
assets(average 
post-period – 
average pre-
period)/10 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Core et al., 
1999 
 
 
CHG_S/TA +  The average 
post-period sales 
figure scaled by 
total assets less 
the average pre-
period sales 
figure scaled by 
total assets 
Sales / Total 
assets 
(average post-
period – 
average pre-
period) 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
 
CHG_CASH_CONSTR - 
 
 The post-period 
average of [Cash 
flow from 
operations - 
(Common and 
preferred 
dividends + cash 
flow used in 
investing) / total 
assets] minus the 
pre-period 
average. 
 [Cash flow 
from 
operations - 
(Common and 
preferred 
dividends + 
cash flow used 
in investing) / 
total assets] 
(average post-
period – 
average pre-
period) 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
 CHG_NOL -  The post-period 
average tax loss 
carry-forward 
minus the pre-
period average 
tax loss carry-
forward 
Average tax 
loss carry-
forward 
(average post-
period – 
average pre-
period 
RI Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
CHG_DIVCON -  The post-period 
average 
(retained 
earnings + cash 
dividend)t / cash 
dividendt-1 minus 
the pre-period 
average 
(retained 
earnings + cash 
dividend)t / cash 
dividendt-1 
(R/E + Cash 
dividends)t / 
Cash 
dividendst-1 
(average post-
period – 
average pre-
period) 
RI Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 Industry Dummies   NAICS code 19 industry 
dummies 
FPInfomart Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
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Dependent Variable. ESO use is defined as the proportion of the total compensation 
(defined in Table 4) to senior management (top 5 executives) paid in options (ESO%). ESO% 
includes only those stock options that were settled in shares. ESOs settled in cash were not 
included in this model and are treated as SARs since the accounting treatment for SARs and 
ESOs differs.
8
 CHG_ESO% is measured as ESO% averaged over the post-Amendment period 
(2004 – 2006) less ESO% averaged over the pre-amendment period to Section 3870 (2000 – 
2002). A larger negative value for CHG_ESO% indicates a greater reduction in ESO use. 
Corporate Governance. The proxies for corporate governance weakness, referred to in 
Model 1 as Governance Variables, are adapted from Core et al. (1999) as used in Brown and Lee 
(2007). These proxies are used to test H2 which predicts a relationship between weak corporate 
governance and a larger decrease in ESO use. The following proxies are used: 
(1) CEOCHAIR, an indicator variable equal to one if the board chair is the firm’s CEO 
and zero otherwise. Core et al. (1999) found that CEO compensation was higher when 
the CEO is the chair of the board (p. 372). The predicted sign for this coefficient is 
negative; 
(2) BOARDSIZE, total number of board directors divided by 100. Core et al. (1999) 
found that CEO compensation was higher when the board of directors was larger (p. 
372). The predicted sign for this coefficient is therefore negative; 
(3) INSIDEDIR, percent of total directors employed by the company. Although there are 
conflicting viewpoints on whether a greater number of inside directors leads to 
stronger corporate governance, Core et al. (1999, p. 372), found when there are more 
inside directors (also referred to throughout the paper as non-independent) versus 
outside directors (independent), CEO compensation is higher (Core et al., 1999, p. 
372). Therefore the predicted sign for this coefficient is negative; 
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(4) BUSYDIR, number of outside directors who serve on three or more other boards, 
scaled by the number of outside directors. Core et al. (1999) also found that CEO 
compensation was higher when “outside directors serve on more than three other 
boards,” (p. 372). The predicted sign for BUSYDIR is  negative; 
(5) CEOHOLDING, percent of outstanding shares owned by the CEO. Core et al. (1999) 
found that “CEO compensation is a decreasing function of the CEO’s ownership 
stake,” (p. 372). The predicted sign for this coefficient is positive; 
(6) NONCEOOWN, indicator variable set equal to zero if at least one inside (non-
independent) board member other than the CEO owns 10% or more of the outstanding 
shares and one otherwise. Core et al. (1999) found that a non-independent board 
member holding 10% of the outstanding shares is linked with lower CEO 
compensation (p. 372). The predicted sign for NONCEOOWN is negative; 
(7) OUTDIROWN, percent of outstanding shares owned by outside directors divided by 
the number of outside directors. CEO compensation is lower when there is an 
independent block holder who owns at least 5%
9
, (Core et al., 1999, p. 404). The 
predicted sign for OUTDIROWN is positive; and 
(8) OUTOWN, indicator variable equal to zero if the firm has an external block holder 
who owns at least 10% of the outstanding shares, and one otherwise. Core et al. 
(1999) found that CEO compensation was a decreasing function when there was an 
external block holder holding at least 10% (p. 372). The predicted sign for this 
coefficient is negative.   
Similar to Brown and Lee (2007), data for the year 2001 is used for the governance 
variables (although data was collected for all relevant sample years 2000 through to 2006). Data 
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for the year 2001 was used because 2001 is the middle year in the pre-amendment period, and 
corporate governance practices do not change drastically over the pre-amendment period. 
Like Brown and Lee, I create a summary variable to capture overall governance weakness 
in an attempt to develop a more stable governance measure and ease interpretation. Initial 
attempts to do this were based on the use of principal components analysis (PCA). However, the 
resulting factors were difficult to interpret, so instead a governance index was created.  To do 
this, values for each of the governance variables for each observation were classified as 
indicating either weak or strong corporate governance. For continuous variables, values were 
compared to the median value to determine if the value was weak or strong, and otherwise 
viewed as strong or weak as discussed previously. Values indicating strong corporate governance 
were coded as 0 and values indicating weak corporate governance were coded as 1, and then all 
the 1's and 0's were summed to create the corporate governance index WEAKGOV. Table 9 
shows this process in more detail (see sensitivity analysis section below for discussion on the 
items B_MEETINGS and CS20 shown in the table). 
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Table 9 
 
Governance Index Summary 
 
Variable Strong Weak Comments 
CEOCHAIR 0 1 The CEO is more 
effective when 
separate from the 
Board Chair 
BOARDSIZE Coded 0 when <, = median 
(9) 
Coded 1 when > 
median (9)   
Smaller boards are 
more effective 
INSIDEDIR Coded 0 when <, = median 
(0.25) 
Coded 1 when > 
median (0.25) 
Having more inside 
directors is less 
effective 
BUSYDIR Coded 0 when <, = median 
(0.4) 
Coded 1 when > 
median (0.4) 
Directors that sit on 
less than 3 boards are 
more effective 
CEOHOLD Coded 0 when >, = (0.05) Coded 1 when < 
(0.05) 
More effective when 
the CEO holds more 
shares 
NONCEOOWN 0 1 More effective non-
independent directors 
hold more shares 
OUTDIROWN Coded 0 when >, = median 
(0.0003) 
Coded 1 when < 
median (0.0003) 
More effective when 
this is larger 
OUTOWN 0 1 More effective when 
there is an external 
block holder 
B_MEETINGS Coded 0 when <, = median 
(7) 
Coded 1 when > 
median (7) 
More effective when 
there are less meetings 
CS20 0 1 More effective when 
there is a shareholder 
holding 20% or more 
of outstanding shares 
  
Earnings Benchmarks. The next two variables are included to test H3. H3 hypothesizes 
that firms that were using ESOs' favorable accounting treatment to achieve earnings benchmarks 
will show greater reduction in ESO use. Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) find that managers try to 
maintain a pattern of increasing earnings (p. 100). They also state that “there is much anecdotal 
evidence of incentives to maintain positive earnings,” (Burgstahler & Dichev, 1997, p. 100). 
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Therefore, for purposes of this study the two earnings benchmark proxies are increasing earnings, 
and positive earnings. “EPS_INC is measured as the proportion of years in the pre-amendment 
period when the firm's earnings per share (EPS) were equal to or greater than the prior year, 
(Carter et al., 2007, p. 333). The predicted sign for this measure is negative. EPS_POS is 
measured as the proportion of years in the pre-amendment period that the firm reported positive 
EPS. The predicted sign for this coefficient is also negative.  
Debt Covenants. LEVERAGE, INT_COV and ISSUE_DEBT was used to measure debt 
contracting concerns. These variables are included to test H4 which is concerned with 
determining an association between debt covenants and decreased use of ESOs. LEVERAGE is 
measured as the ratio of long-term debt to equity averaged over 2000-2002. “Higher leverage has 
been associated with income-increasing accounting choices in many studies,” (Scott, 1991, p. 
68). INT_COV is defined as earnings before interest and taxes divided by total interest (divided 
by 100) averaged over the pre-amendment period. LEVERAGE and INT_COV are used to proxy 
for debt contracting costs because as Scott (1991) states, the most common covenants are 
leverage and interest coverage,” (p.68). ISSUE_DEBT is an indicator variable that equals one if 
the firm issued debt in the pre-period and zero if they did not issue debt in the pre-period (Carter 
et al., 2007, p. 334). The predicted signs for LEVERAGE, INT_COV and ISSUE_DEBT are 
negative.   
Political Visibility. Politically visible firms are predicted to decrease ESOs more and 
therefore will have a larger reaction to the amendment to Section 3870. To proxy for political 
pressures to cut back on option-based compensation, ln_SIZE and TOP5% are included in Model 
1. ln_SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of equity (Brown & Lee, 
2007) averaged over the pre-amendment period divided by 100. CFMRC was used to get the 
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market value data and where the information was not available, Research Insight was used. The 
predicted coefficient is negative.  
Since compensation for the top five executives has been made available to investors, they 
can monitor the number of options granted to the top executives and compare that to the total 
options granted. Since 2002 when pro-forma disclosure was introduced, investors can also 
determine what the top executives are earning specifically in ESOs. TOP5% is the number of 
options granted to the top five executives as a percent of total options granted to all employees 
(Brown & Lee, 2007) averaged over the pre-period. The predicted coefficient is also negative for 
this proxy.  
 Growth Opportunities. BM is the book value of equity divided by the market value of 
equity and is included in Model 1 to proxy for growth opportunities (Brown & Lee, 2007; Carter 
et al., 2007) averaged over the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. This proxy is included 
because firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to reward their senior 
management by offering them ESOs in lieu of other types of compensation alternatives because 
share price better captures firm investments that will not pay off until later years. Market to book 
should be used, but using the book value as the denominator results in divisor problems when 
book value is very small or close to zero. The predicted sign for this coefficient is negative.  
Other Economic Determinants. Similar to Brown and Lee (2007) and Carter et al. (2007) 
standard economic determinants of compensation are included in Model 1 as controls and 
include: CUM_RET, CHG_ln_SALES, CHG_ROA, CHG_CASH_CNSTR, CHG_NOL and 
CHG_DIVCON. These variables are all measured as their average 2004 - 2006 values minus 
their average 2000 - 2002 values for Model 1. 
Stock Market. Brown and Lee (2007) found that firms with lower cumulative returns in 
the pre-period had greater ESO cutbacks, “implying that poorer stock price performance results 
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in lower ESO value and thus a larger decrease in ESO%,” (p. 21). CUM_RET is measured as the 
three year annual rate of return (including price appreciation and dividend reinvestment and 
payments) divided by 100. This variable was collected from Research Insight (Standard and 
Poors, 1996). The predicted sign for this variable is positive. 
CHG_ln_SALES. As size increases, it becomes harder to monitor top management. These 
larger corporations are more likely to offer ESOs to align shareholder and manager goals. 
ln_SALES is included to proxy for size and is measured as the natural logarithm of sales (Brown 
& Lee, 2007; Core & Guay, 1999). This coefficient is predicted to be positive. 
CHG_ROA. It is assumed that executive compensation is positively correlated with firm 
performance which is proxied as the accounting return on assets. CHG_ROA is computed as the 
ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to the average of beginning- and end-of-year total 
assets, (Core et al., 1999, p. 379), divided by 10 and the predicted sign is positive. 
CHG_CASH_CONSTR. The formula for cash constraints has been re-arranged (to ease in 
interpretation) from Carter et al., (2007, p. 337) and Core and Guay (1999), and is included in 
Model 1 because firms facing liquidity problems pre-amendment were more likely to use options 
in lieu of cash compensation to conserve cash. The formula used in this study is defined as [Cash 
flow from operations – (common and preferred dividends + cash flow used in investing) / total 
assets]. A negative number indicates a cash shortfall. The predicted co-efficient for this measure 
is negative.  
CHG_NOL. Following Brown and Lee (2007), CHG_NOL is also included in Model 1. 
Brown and Lee (2007) state that, “substituting ESOs for other forms of compensation is costlier 
for firms with higher marginal tax rates,” (p.17) in the pre-amendment period since ESOs did not 
require an initial cash outlay. Firms were able to use options to conserve cash. In order to proxy 
for this, CHG_NOL has been included in Model 1 and is calculated as the average post-
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amendment to Section 3870 tax loss carry-forward minus the average pre-amendment to Section 
3870 tax loss carry-forward divided by 100. CHG_NOL is included in Model 1 “to proxy for 
firms’ marginal tax rates,” (Brown & Lee, 2007, p. 17). The predicted sign for CHG_NOL is 
negative. 
CHG_DIVCON. Finally CHG_DIVCON is included because payment of dividends and 
repurchase of shares are dependent upon retained earnings and the decision and ability to pay for 
these affects how many ESOs can be granted in a year. Prior studies (Core & Guay, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 1996), “suggest that ESO use is positively related to the extent to which a lack of 
retained earnings constrains the firm’s ability to pay dividends and repurchase shares,” (Brown & 
Lee, 2007, p. 18). As previously mentioned, ESOs were attractive in the pre-amendment to 
Section 3870 period because firms that may have been constrained with respect to earnings 
would have granted more ESOs as no expense was required on the income statement. Due to 
non-availability of data with regards to stock repurchases (data was not provided on Research 
Insight or other available data sources), the variable DIVCON has been slightly modified from 
the previously identified studies, but still included in Model 1. CHG_DIVCON is calculated as 
the average post-amendment to Section 3870 [(retained earnings + cash dividends)t / cash 
dividendst-1] less the average pre-amendment to Section 3870 [(retained earnings + cash 
dividends)t / cash dividendst-1]. The predicted sign for the coefficient CHG_DIVCON is negative.  
Industry Indicators. Similar to Carter et al. (2007) and Oyer and Schaefer (2005), an 
industry variable dummy variable is included to capture labor market conditions and control for 
attraction and retention reasons that may affect compensation design. It has been noted that 
industry indicators control for other differences when it comes to pay practices across industries 
(Carter et al., 2007, p.340). The North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) was 
used and codes were at the two-digit level.  
 55 
 
Finally all variables have been winsorized at 1% and 99%. As previously stated, Table 8 
provides a summary of the variables used in Model 1. 
Univariate and Multivariate Analysis 
Table 10 displays the descriptive statistics for the determinants of ESO cutbacks. The 
mean (median) CHG_ESO% was a decrease of 9.3% (6.7%). Compared to Brown and Lee 
(2007) this decrease is smaller than the firms in their sample which had a mean (median) 
decrease CHG_ESO% of 11.49% (10.3%). The difference for CHG_ESO% between this sample 
and Brown and Lee’s (2007) is similar to the finding in Table 5 where the Canadian sample 
shows a smaller decrease in ESO use than their U.S. counterparts.  
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Table 10 
 
Descriptive statistics on ESO Change and the determinants of ESO change 
 
Variable Mean Median  Std. Dev. 
CHG_ESO% -0.09 -0.07 0.19 
CEOCHAIR 0.37 0.00 0.49 
BOARDSIZE 0.10 0.09 0.03 
INSIDEDIR 0.28 0.25 0.15 
BUSYDIR 0.42 0.40 0.26 
CEOHOLDING 0.06 0.00 0.12 
NONCEOOWN 0.83 1.00 0.37 
OUTDIROWN 0.01 0.00 0.02 
OUTOWN 0.29 0.00 0.46 
B_MEETINGS 0.09 0.09 0.04 
CS20 0.55 1.00 0.50 
WEAKGOV 
EPS_INC 
5.09 
0.56 
5.00 
0.67 
1.77 
0.27 
EPS_POS 0.79 1.00 0.32 
LEVERAGE 0.56 0.58 0.21 
INT_COV 0.13 0.04 0.31 
ISSUE_DEBT 0.79 1.00 0.41 
ln_SIZE 0.20 0.20 0.04 
TOP5% 0.31 0.27 0.20 
CUM_RET 0.65 0.39 2.23 
BM 0.37 0.07 3.70 
CHG_lnSALES 0.35 0.21 0.77 
CHG_ROA 0.34 0.10 1.05 
CHG_CASH_CONSTR 0.04 0.03 0.09 
CHG_NOL 0.70 0.00 2.88 
CHG_DIVCON 0.25 0.00 21.38 
 
Around 37 percent of firms in the sample had a separate CEO and chairman of the board 
and the average board size was 10 members. The average number of directors employed by the 
company is 28%. Brown and Lee (2007) found the average board size was 9 and that on average 
28% of directors were employed by the company. A substantive difference between the Canadian 
setting and Brown and Lee’s findings was the difference between busy directors. There were 
forty-two percent of board members sitting on three or more boards in this Canadian sample 
compared to just 12% in Brown and Lee’s (2007) sample. The average CEO holds six percent of 
 57 
 
the firm’s outstanding shares. The average interest coverage ratio in the pre-amendment period is 
13. This indicates that firms were able to cover their interest expenses. The mean book to market 
value of equity rate was 37% and on average 31% of all ESO grants were made to the top five 
executives in the pre-amendment period. 
 Table 11 below presents Spearman correlations between variables used to estimate Model 
1. To keep things simple, Table 11 does not show the individual governance variables – it only 
shows the index variable WEAKGOV. However, it should be noted that CHG_ESO% is highly 
correlated with B_SIZE (p = 0.01), BUSYDIR (p = 0.03), CEOHOLDING (p = 0.002) and 
OUTDIROWN (p = 0.06) all in the predicted direction (see Table 8 for these predictions). The 
change in ESOs is highly correlated (p < 0.0001) with firm size and with the proportion of stock 
options offered to the top five executives. The negative sign on the coefficients are consistent 
with H5 which indicates that firms that are more politically visible cut back more on ESO use 
after the amendment to Section 3870 was implemented. Other significant correlations are 
between change ESOs and the following economic determinants: CUM_RET, SALES and 
DIV_CON. Correlations between the change in ESOs and EPS_INC, EPS_POS and CHG_ROA 
were not in the expected direction and not significant except for EPS_INC which was significant; 
all other sign predictions hold (although not significant). 
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Table 11 
 
Correlation Matrix for Model 1 Variables (N = 175) 
 
 Chg 
ESO 
WEAK 
GOV 
EPS 
INC 
EPS 
POS 
LEV INT 
COV 
ISS 
DEBT 
ln_ 
SIZE 
TOP 
5% 
CUM 
RET 
BM SALES ROA CSH 
CNSTR 
NOL DIV 
CON 
CHG 
ESO 
1.00                
WEAK 
GOV 
-
0.12 
1.00               
EPS 
INC 
0.16 -0.07 1.00              
EPS 
POS 
0.04 -0.08 0.27 1.00             
LEV -.01 -0.18 0.14 0.09 1.00            
INT 
COV 
-.05 -0.08 0.14 0.55 -.18 1.00           
ISSUE 
DEBT 
-.05 -0.11 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.14 1.00         
ln_ 
SIZE 
-.32 -0.53 0.10 0.40 0.05 0.28 0.08 1.00         
TOP5% -.15 0.08 -.03 -.13 -.06 -.08 -.05 -.13 1.00        
CUM 
RET 
0.15 
0.11 
-0.13 
-0.00 
0.34 
-.24 
0.34 
-.17 
-.05 
0.06 
0.20 
-.18 
0.09 
0.17 
0.16 
-.32 
0.09 
0.09 
1.00 
-.23 
1.00     
BM 
SALES 0.13 0.02 0.11 -.05 -.36 -.05 -.08 -.10 0.00 0.26 -.2 1.00     
ROA -.06 -0.01 -.20 -.48 -.09 -.30 -.05 -.18 0.05 -.13 .01 0.28 1.00    
CSH 
CNSTR 
-.06 0.11 0.04 -.19 -.12 -.22 0.01 -.07 -.01 -.16 -.12 0.05 0.31 1.00   
NOL -.7 -0.10 0.02 -.06 0.03 -.06 -.6 0.01 0.10 -.15 -.00 -.10 -.18 -.07 1.00  
DIV 
CON 
-.16 0.04 -.07 0.03 -.13 0.06 0.06 0.02 -.01 0.11 -.05 0.15 0.13 0.03 -.05 1.00 
Note. All variables are as defined in Table 8. Spearman correlation coefficients are presented. 
Bold text indicates significance at the 0.10 level (two-tailed) or better.  
 
OLS Results 
Table 12 displays the results for the OLS regression for Model 1.
10
 
 Column Three displays the results when all governance items are included individually in 
Model 1. Column Four shows the results for Model 1 when the governance index variable 
(WEAKGOV), is used instead of the individual governance variables. Columns Five and Six 
show the results for Model 1 omitting any observations with a student residual greater than two 
for the two versions of the governance items respectively.    
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Consistent with H2, firms that had a larger number of busy directors (BUSYDIR) pre-
amendment reduced ESO use more, suggesting that boards with a larger number of directors 
sitting on three or more boards are less effective at monitoring (p = 0.10). This was the only 
individual governance variable that showed significance, however the majority of the signs on the 
governance variables are in the predicted direction. The governance index is not significant, as 
shown in Column Four. Thus, overall there is no support for H2. 
There was no support for H3 which predicted a greater ESO decrease for firms using 
ESOs’ favorable accounting treatment to achieve earnings benchmarks. It appears that firms with 
an increase in EPS in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period were less likely to cut back on 
ESO use. There was also no support for H4 since there was no evidence that firms closer to 
earnings based debt covenants decreased ESO use more. 
Consistent with Brown and Lee (2007) and Darrough and Li (2006), the coefficients for 
TOP5% and ln_SIZE are negative and significant (p = 0.002 and p = 0.04 respectively). This 
suggests that firms that are more politically visible were motivated more to reduce ESO use after 
the amendment to Section 3870 because of the negative public attitude towards ESO use, 
supporting H5. Finally, Column Three suggests that there is no support for H6 which predicts a 
smaller decrease in ESO use for firms with greater growth opportunities. The coefficient on BM 
is positive (opposite of the prediction) under this scenario, although it is only weakly significant 
(p = 0.1). Once the outliers are removed, BM is no longer significant, so I conclude that H6 is not 
supported.   
There were six outliers in Model 1 when all governance variables were included 
individually. When the index variable WEAKGOV was used there were nine firms that qualified 
as outliers. Similar to Column Three, Column Five displays the results when all governance items 
are included individually and Column Six shows the index variable when governance items are 
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combined into one variable (WEAKGOV), after removal of the observations with student 
residuals greater than two. It is worth noting that when outliers were removed from Model 1, 
(refer to Column 5) the sign direction changed for the coefficients for OUTDIROWN and 
LEVERAGE. As previously mentioned, there have been conflicting viewpoints with regards to 
governance variables which could explain the sign change for OUTDIROWN. The coefficients 
for Model 1 including the governance index and no outliers did not show much change (Table 12, 
Column 6). 
In order to further test H6 which predicted a smaller decrease in ESOs for firms that had 
greater growth opportunities, Model 1 was re-run with only firms having a BM ratio less than the 
median (0.07) included. The results are shown in Table 12, Column Seven. Although only 
weakly significant, under this version of Model 1 it appears that there is some support for H6 in 
that firms with greater growth opportunities reduced ESO use less than other firms in the post-
amendment period. 
Table 12 
 
Determinants of Firms’ Decisions to Reduce the Use of ESOs after 
the Amendment to Section 3870 
(1) 
 
Variable 
(2) 
Predicted 
Sign 
(3) 
Model 1 (M1) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
M1 Index 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
M1 No 
Outliers 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
M1 Index 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(7) 
M1 (BM < 
0.07) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept ? 0.15 
(0.82) 
0.17 
(0.92) 
0.13 
(0.71) 
0.16 
(0.87) 
1.08** 
(2.15) 
CEOCHAIR (H2) - -0.01 
(-0.19) 
 -0.01 
(-0.22) 
  
BOARDSIZE (H2) - -0.26 
(-0.42) 
 -0.47 
(-0.75) 
  
INSIDEDIR (H2) - 0.01 
(0.04) 
 0.01 
(0.10) 
  
BUSYDIR (H2) - -0.10* 
(-1.60) 
 -0.10* 
(-1.50) 
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(1) 
 
Variable 
(2) 
Predicted 
Sign 
(3) 
Model 1 (M1) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
M1 Index 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
M1 No 
Outliers 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
M1 Index 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(7) 
M1 (BM < 
0.07) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
CEOHOLDING (H2) + 0.08 
(0.51) 
 0.07 
(0.40) 
  
NONCEOOWN (H2) - -0.04 
(-0.78) 
 -0.04 
(-0.86) 
  
OUTDIROWN (H2) + 0.15 
(0.16) 
 -0.01 
(-0.00) 
  
OUTOWN (H2) - 0.04 
(0.92) 
 0.02 
(0.70) 
  
WEAKGOV (H2) -  -0.01 
(-0.70) 
 -0.00 
(-0.21) 
-0.01 
(-0.65) 
EPS_INC (H3) - 0.09* 
(1.49) 
0.10** 
(1.71) 
0.08* 
(1.29) 
0.09* 
(1.38) 
0.11 
(0.86) 
EPS_POS (H3) - 0.04 
(0.56) 
0.02 
(0.30) 
0.05 
(0.73) 
0.03 
(0.41) 
0.07 
(0.54) 
LEVERAGE (H4) - -0.02 
(-0.15) 
-0.06 
(-0.60) 
0.02 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(-0.23) 
-0.05 
(-0.32) 
INT_COV (H4) - 0.01 
(0.27) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.34) 
0.02 
(0.29) 
0.03 
(0.46) 
ISSUE_DEBT (H4) - 0.02 
(0.43) 
0.01 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.45) 
0.02 
(0.42) 
-0.00 
(-0.04) 
ln_SIZE (H5) - -1.11*** 
(-2.18) 
-1.30**** 
(-2.71) 
-1.00*** 
(-1.95) 
-1.27**** 
(-2.65) 
-5.30*** 
(-2.54) 
TOP5% (H5) - -0.26**** 
(-3.26) 
-0.25**** 
(-3.16) 
-0.28**** 
(-3.54) 
-0.26**** 
(-3.15) 
-0.30** 
(-2.15) 
CUM_RET + 0.00 
(0.21) 
0.00 
(0.38) 
0.00 
(0.11) 
0.00 
(0.23) 
0.00 
(0.51) 
BM (H6) - 0.01* 
(1.32) 
0.00 
(1.15) 
0.00 
(1.23) 
0.00 
(1.05) 
-0.53* 
(-1.60) 
CHG_lnSALES + -0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.23) 
-0.01 
(-0.48) 
-0.04 
(-1.07) 
CHG_ROA + -0.01 
(-0.32) 
 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.01 
(-0.39) 
-0.02 
(-0.78) 
-0.02 
(-0.41) 
CHG_CASH_CNSTR - 0.08 
(0.44) 
0.09 
(0.46) 
0.11 
(0.54) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
0.23 
(0.69) 
CHG_NOL - -0.00 
(-0.64) 
-0.00 
(-0.79) 
-0.00 
(-0.52) 
-0.00 
(-0.74) 
0.00 
(0.17) 
CHG_DIVCON - -0.00** 
(-1.84) 
-0.00* 
(-1.56) 
-0.00*** 
(-2.57) 
-0.00*** 
(-2.24) 
-0.00 
(-0.75) 
Industry Dummies  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N  175 175 169 166 83 
Adj. R
2 
 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.11 
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed.  ***p < .01, two-tailed. ****p < .001, two-tailed. 
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Sensitivity Analysis 
The number of board meetings held over the year divided by 100 – B_MEETINGS, 
(Choudhary et al., 2007) – was also collected. A greater number of meetings may suggest a more 
effective and active board. However it may also indicate a reactionary response on the part of the 
board to poor performance or bad outcomes (Choudhary et al., 2007). In Canada, the number of 
board meetings was not always disclosed for years in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. 
Therefore if the number of board meetings (B_MEETINGS) was not available for the year 2001, 
an average of board meetings was calculated given all years disclosed by the firm and used 
instead. The predicted sign for this variable is positive. 
In addition to B_MEETINGS, CS20 is included to proxy for closely held firms. CS20 is 
an indicator variable that equals zero if the firm is closely held, and one if the firm is not closely 
held, (Park et al., 2001, p.352). Consistent with Park et al. (2001), closely held firms are defined 
as one with a controlling shareholder who owns 20 percent or more of the voting shares of the 
firm. To be consistent with Core et al. (1999) it is predicted that the change in ESOs will be less 
when a firm is considered closely held. The predicted coefficient for CS20 is negative. Also, 
because there were conflicting prior research findings on the likely effects of the variable 
INSIDEDIR, it was coded in the opposite direction for the index variable WEAKGOV, and 
Model 1 was re-run. 
To avoid a mechanical relationship (meaning when one increases the other automatically 
increases and vice versa) between CHG_ROA and CHG_ ESO%, a variable CHG_S/TA has 
been included. The mechanical relationship is induced because total compensation is included as 
an expense and affects EBIT which is the numerator in the formula for CHG_ROA. By using 
sales instead of EBIT, the expense for ESOs is not included in the variable CHG_S/TA.  
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CHG_S/TA is the average sales scaled by total assets in the post period minus the average sales 
scaled by total assets in the pre period. The predicted sign for this coefficient is also positive. 
Table 13 shows the results of running Model 1 with these changes as discussed.  In 
particular, WEAKGOV has been modified to include B_MEETINGS and CS0, CHG_S/TA has 
been included, and INSIDEDIR coded in the opposite direction. Running Model 1 with the 
additional variables does not increase the adjusted R
2 
and does not increase the explanatory 
power of Model 1 as shown in Table 13, Columns 3 and 4 (outliers removed). As noted above 
there were also conflicting viewpoints with the variable INSIDEDIR. Model 1 was re-run with 
this variable coded in the opposite direction and included in the index variable WEAKGOV. This 
change did not increase the significance of this variable as shown in Table 13, Columns 5 and 6 
(outliers removed). Finally, WEAKGOV was modified to include CS20 and B_MEETINGS and 
the results of running Model 1 with this inclusion is shown in Columns 7 and 8 (outliers 
removed) of Table 13. These changes were made to determine if the index variable WEAKGOV 
would increase in significance. Similar to Seethamraju and Zach (2003), there was no evidence 
that weaker corporate governance affected firms’ change in ESO use.     
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Table 13 
Determinants of Firms’ Decisions to Reduce the Use of ESOs after the Amendment to Section 
3870 – Supplementary Analysis 
(1) 
Variables 
(2) 
Predicted 
Sign 
(3) 
M1 
(additional 
variables) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
M1 (A.V. 
N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
M1 Index 
INSIDEDIR 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
M1 Index 
INSIDEDIR 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
 
(7) 
M1 Index 
(all gov. 
vars.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(8) 
M1 Index 
(all gov. 
vars. N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept ? 0.11 
(0.61) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
0.15 
(0.82) 
0.16 
(0.86) 
019 
(1.01) 
0.17 
(0.91) 
CEOCHAIR (H2) - -0.00 
(-0.10) 
-0.01 
(-0.18) 
    
BOARDSIZE (H2) - -0.21 
(-0.32) 
-0.48 
(-0.74) 
    
INSIDEDIR (H2) - 0.05 
(0.36) 
0.03 
(0.21) 
    
CEOHOLDING (H2) + 0.06 
(0.40) 
0.07 
(0.40) 
    
NONCEOOWN (H2) - -0.03 
(-0.74) 
-0.04 
(-0.87) 
    
OUTDIROWN (H2) + 0.24 
(0.24) 
0.31 
(0.31) 
    
OUTOWN (H2) - 0.05 
(1.04) 
0.03 
(0.72) 
    
B_MEETINGS (H2) + 0.36 
(0.78) 
0.45 
(0.96) 
    
CS20 - -0.02 
(-0.58) 
-0.02 
(-0.47) 
    
WEAKGOV -   -0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.00 
(-0.25) 
-0.01 
(-0.70) 
-0.01 
(-1.01) 
EPS_INC (H3) - 0.09* 
(1.50) 
0.08 
(1.23) 
0.10* 
(1.58) 
0.09* 
(1.41) 
0.11** 
(1.74) 
0.10** 
(1.66) 
EPS_POS (H3) - 0.05 
(0.69) 
0.07 
(0.99) 
0.02 
(0.27) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.28) 
0.02 
(0.25) 
LEVERAGE (H4) - -0.02 
(-0.21) 
-0.00 
(-0.03) 
-0.04 
(-0.42) 
-0.04 
(-0.41) 
-0.06 
(-0.63) 
-0.05 
(-0.49) 
INT_COV (H4) - 0.01 
(0.14) 
0.01 
(0.20) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.02 
(0.37) 
0.01 
(0.24) 
0.01 
(0.23) 
ISSUE_DEBT (H4) - 0.01 
(0.25) 
0.02 
(0.38) 
0.01 
(0.29) 
0.00 
(0.09) 
0.01 
(0.32) 
0.01 
(0.35) 
ln_SIZE (H5) - -1.14*** 
(-2.20) 
-1.00** 
(-1.90) 
-1.26*** 
(-2.69) 
-1.27*** 
(-2.57) 
-1.35*** 
(-2.83) 
-1.31*** 
(-2.80) 
TOP5% (H5) - -0.26**** 
(-3.19) 
-0.28**** 
(-3.44) 
-0.25*** 
(-3.22) 
-0.24*** 
(-3.04) 
-0.24**** 
(-3.14) 
-0.25**** 
(-3.18) 
CUM_RET  + 0.00 
(0.35) 
0.00 
(0.18) 
0.00 
(0.49) 
0.00 
(0.38) 
0.00 
(0.37) 
0.00 
(0.45) 
BM (H6) - 0.01* 
(1.29) 
0.01 
(1.25) 
0.00 
(1.11) 
0.00 
(1.08) 
0.00 
(1.13) 
0.00 
(1.11) 
CHG_lnSALES + -0.01 
(-0.44) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.01 
(-0.64) 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.63) 
-0.02 
(-0.64) 
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(1) 
Variables 
(2) 
Predicted 
Sign 
(3) 
M1 
(additional 
variables) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
M1 (A.V. 
N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
M1 Index 
INSIDEDIR 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
M1 Index 
INSIDEDIR 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
 
(7) 
M1 Index 
(all gov. 
vars.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(8) 
M1 Index 
(all gov. 
vars. N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
CHG_ROA + -0.01 
(-0.35) 
-0.01 
(-0.37) 
-0.01 
(-0.46) 
-0.01 
(-0.62) 
-0.01 
(-0.42) 
-0.01 
(-0.47) 
CHG_S/TA + 0.02 
(0.30) 
0.03 
(0.47) 
 
 
   
CHG_CASH_CNSTR - 0.07 
(0.36) 
0.04 
(0.21) 
0.10 
(0.55) 
0.11 
(0.58) 
0.09 
(0.46) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
CHG_NOL - -0.00 
(-0.79) 
-0.00 
(-0.85) 
-0.00 
(-0.78) 
-0.00 
(-0.82) 
-0.00 
(-0.76) 
-0.00 
(0.73) 
CHG_DIVCON - -0.00** 
(-1.85) 
-0.00*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.00* 
(-1.51) 
-0.00* 
(-1.59) 
-0.00* 
(-1.57) 
-0.00* 
(-1.54) 
Industry Dummies  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
N  175 169 175 169 175 175 
Adj. R
2 
 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed.  ***p < .01, two-tailed. ****p < .001, two-tailed. 
Summary 
To summarize the results of Model 1, with regards to corporate governance (H2), the 
number of busy directors (directors sitting on three or more boards) affected the amount of ESOs 
that were offered to senior management. Although an index was created to capture overall 
governance weakness, this variable (WEAKGOV) was not found to be significant under any 
variations of Model 1, and thus H2 was not supported. It also appears that firms did not use the 
favorable accounting treatment of ESOs in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period to achieve 
earnings benchmarks (H3). Contrary to H3, firms with a steady EPS increase in the pre-period 
used ESOs more in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period. Model 1 results provided no 
evidence to support the prediction that Canadian firms used ESOs to ensure they did not violate 
earnings based debt covenants (H4). There was support for H5 which predicted firms that were 
more visible politically would decrease ESO use more. Finally, it appears that firms with more 
growth opportunities did experience a smaller decrease in ESO use post-amendment to Section 
3870 (H6). Overall these findings are different than Brown and Lee (2007) who found support for 
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their corporate governance; earnings based debt covenants and earnings benchmarks hypotheses. 
My findings indicate that firms that were more visible politically reduced ESO use more which is 
consistent with non-opportunistic earnings management.  
Hypotheses 7 a-b 
Model and Variables 
The next sets of tests examine how firms restructured senior management compensation 
after the amendment to Section 3870. RSUs are the focus of these tests. BONUS was added as a 
dependent variable on a post hoc basis since there was a significant unexpected increase in the 
use of bonuses post-amendment, as shown in Table 5. Similar to Brown and Lee (2007), the 
proportional change in RSUs given a decrease in ESOs (p.23) is examined. I also examine 
whether this proportional change became less unequal after the amendment to Section 3870. 
Models 2a and b are estimated using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) because the error 
terms are likely to be correlated.  
 
(2a) ∆ (COMP_ALT) = δ0 +δ1 ∆ ESO + δ2 3870 + [δ3 ∆ ESO * 3870]  
+ δ4 ∑∆ Economic Determinants + ∑ Industry Dummies + ε 
 
 Table 14 provides a summary of variables for Model 2a including sign predictions, 
descriptions and calculations and is presented below. 
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Table 14 
Table of Variables for Model 2a 
Category  Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
D.V. COMP_ALT 
(RSUs or 
BONUS) 
? H7a and b One of the non-
ESO 
compensation 
vehicles (RSUs or 
BONUS) scaled 
by total 
compensation for 
year t minus one 
of the non-ESO 
compensation 
vehicles (RSUs or 
BONUS) scaled 
by total 
compensation for 
year t-1. 
(Comp_alt t  
– comp_alt 
t-1)  / (total 
compt  -
total compt-
1)  
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
 ∆ESO - H7a and b Change in the 
grant-date Black-
Scholes value 
between years t 
and t-1, scaled by 
the change in 
total 
compensation 
between years t 
and t-1 
(ESO t  – 
ESO t-1)  / 
(total compt  
- total 
compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
 3870 + H7a and b Indicator variable 
equal to one if the 
observation is 
from 2004 - 2006 
and zero if the 
observation is 
from 2000 – 2002 
1 or 0 F/S Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
Economic 
Determinants 
ln_SALES ?  Logarithm of 
sales at the end of 
year t minus the 
logarithm of sales 
for the year end t-
1 
(Logarithm 
of Sales)t - 
(Logarithm 
of Sales)t-1 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
BM ?  Year-end book 
value of equity 
divided by the 
year-end market 
value of equity 
for year t minus 
book value of 
equity divided by 
market value of 
equity for year t-1 
(Year-end 
B.V equity / 
year-end 
market 
value of 
equity)t - 
(B.V equity 
/ market 
value of 
equity)t-1 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
and/or 
CFMRC 
Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
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Category  Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
 CASH_CONSTR ?   [Cash flow from 
operations - 
(common and 
preferred 
dividends + cash 
flow used in 
investing) / total 
assets] for year t 
minus  [Cash 
flow from 
operations - 
(common and 
preferred 
dividends + cash 
flow used in 
investing) / total 
assets] for year t-
1 
[Cash flow 
from 
operations - 
(common 
and 
preferred 
dividends + 
cash flow 
used in 
investing) / 
total assets]t 
- [Cash 
flow from 
operations - 
(common 
and 
preferred 
dividends + 
cash flow 
used in 
investing) / 
total 
assets]t-1  
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
NOL ?  The tax loss 
carry-forward for 
year t minus the 
tax loss carry-
forward for year 
t-1 
Tax loss 
carry-
forwardt – 
tax loss 
carry-
forwardt-1 
RI Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
DIVCON ?  [(Retained 
earnings + cash 
dividend)t / cash 
dividendt-1]t  
minus [(retained 
earnings + cash 
dividend)t / cash 
dividendt-1]t-1 
[(R/E + 
Cash 
dividends)t / 
Cash 
dividendst-
1]t - [(R/E + 
Cash 
dividends)t / 
Cash 
dividendst-
1]t-1 
RI Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
 Industry 
Dummies 
?  NAICS code 20 Industry 
Dummies 
FPInfomart Brown 
and Lee, 
2007 
 
 Model 2a is estimated for the two compensation alternatives using all available 
observations from 2000-2006. The year 2003 continues to be excluded for the reasons previously 
stated. The dependent variable, ∆ (COMP_ALT), in Model 2a is the change in one of the non-
ESO compensation vehicles (RSUs or bonuses) for year t less year t-1, scaled by the change in 
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total compensation between year t and t-1.
11 
The dependent variable captures the proportion of 
additional total compensation that is made up of an alternative compensation component.  
∆ ESO is the change in the fair value of ESOs awarded to the top five executives for year 
t less t-1, scaled by the change in their total compensation between year t and t-1. The predicted 
sign of this coefficient is negative and less than one if ESOs and other forms of compensation 
substitute for each other in the pre-amendment period (Brown & Lee, 2007), and if less of the 
compensation alternative is needed to offset the loss of a given amount of ESOs.  
3870 is an indicator variable set equal to one if the observation is from the post-
amendment to Section 3870 period (2004-2006) and zero for the period prior to the amendment 
to Section 3870 (2000-2002). The prediction for this coefficient is positive, as the use of 
compensation alternatives is expected to expand in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period as 
the alternatives are used to provide increases in compensation, even holding the change in ESOs 
constant at zero.  
δ1 and (δ1 + δ3) indicate the average substitution rate for the compensation alternative in 
question relative to a loss of  option-based compensation in the pre- and post Section 3870 
amendment periods, respectively (Brown & Lee, 2007). δ1 provides the substitution rate in the 
pre-amendment to Section 3870 period and (δ1 + δ3) provides the substitution rate in the post-
amendment period. The coefficient on the interaction term ∆ ESO * 3870, “indicates the 
differential dollar change in non-ESO compensation predicted by a dollar change in ESOs from 
the pre- to the post,” (Brown & Lee, 2007, p. 27) amendment to Section 3870 period. If δ3 is 
negative, it indicates that the substitution rate increased for the compensation alternative in 
question relative to a loss in ESOs (in dollars) in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period 
(Brown & Lee, 2007). If δ3 is negative, then the first part of H7b - which predicts a substitution 
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rate between RSUs and ESOs that is less unequal than in the pre-amendment period - is 
supported. 
The economic determinants included in Model 2a are ln_SALES, BM, CASH_CONSTR, 
NOL and DIVCON (see Table 14 for definitions). These variables were determined as the change 
between year t and t-1 for this model to reduce error and maintain consistency across Model 2a. 
The industry variables included in Model 2a are defined as above for Model 1 (Table 8). 
Extension to Model 2a - Incorporation of Additional Factors 
 After reviewing Carter et al. (2007) it became apparent that there are other factors that 
explain how firms determine executive compensation components. For example, Carter et al. 
include proxies for equity constraints, risk aversion, dividend yield, and volatility in addition to 
standard economic determinants. All of these additional variables were significant in the model 
Carter et al. (2007) used to explain total CEO compensation. Therefore Model 2a has been 
modified and re-run to include these additional factors. Model 2b better explains the determinants 
of senior management compensation and this is clear when comparing the adjusted R
2 
across the 
models (see Table17 below). Presented below is Model 2b:  
  
(2b) ∆ COMP_ALT = δ0 +δ1 ∆ ESO + δ2 3870 + [δ3 ∆ ESO * 3870]  
+ δ4 ∑∆ Economic Determinants + δ5 ∆DIV_YLD + δ6 ∆EQ_CONSTR 
+ δ7 ∆TENURE + δ8 ∆ln_TOTASSETS + δ9 ∆ WEAKGOV + δ10 ∆ RET 
+ δ11 ∆ROA + δ12 ∆COMP_ALT + δ13 ∆ MISC_COMP + δ14∆SARS 
+ δ15 ∆ALL_OTHER + δ16 ∆PENSION + δ17 ∆PSUS + δ18 ∆SALARY 
+ ∑ Industry Dummies + ε 
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 All variables that are identical to Model 2a are as previously defined in Table 14. All 
variables are calculated as changes for year t less year t-1. The rationales for the new variables 
and their definitions are as follows. A summary of the new variables for Model 2b is provided in 
Table 15. 
Table 15 
Table of Variables for Model 2b 
Category Proxy Sign Description Calculation Source Citation 
Dividend 
yield 
DIV_YLD ? Dividends per share / 
price per share at the 
end of the year t minus 
dividends per share / 
price per share at the 
end of the year t-1 (as 
defined and provided 
by FPInfomart when 
available) 
(Dividends per 
share / Price 
per share)t - 
(Dividends per 
share / Price 
per share)t-1 
FPInfomart 
F/S and 
CFMR / 
TSE 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
Equity 
constraints 
EQ_CONSTR ? The ratio of issued to 
authorized shares for 
year t minus the ratio of 
issued to authorized 
shares for year t-1. (A 
ratio approaching 1 
means more equity 
constraints.) 
(Issued shares / 
authorized 
shares)t - 
(Issued shares / 
authorized 
shares)t-1 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
Risk Aversion TENURE ? Number of years the 
CEO has held that 
position 
 
 
Proxy Carter et 
al., 2007 
 ln_TOTASSETS ? The natural logarithm 
of total assets for year t 
minus the natural 
logarithm of total assets 
for year t-1. 
(Log of total 
assets)t - (Log 
of total assets)t-
1 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
Corporate 
Governance 
WEAKGOV ? Governance index as 
defined in Table 9 
See Table 9 Proxy  
 RET ? Annual rates of return 
reflecting monthly price 
appreciation, plus 
reinvestment of 
monthly dividends and 
the compounding effect 
of dividends paid on 
reinvested dividends. 
Based on a percentage 
change of the value 
over 12 months 
 
 
Annual rate of 
return 
RI Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 72 
 
Category Proxy Sign Description Calculation Source Citation 
 ROA  Net income divided by 
total assets for year t 
minus net income 
divided by total assets 
for year t-1 
ROAt – ROAt-1 F/S Carter et 
al., 2007 
 COMP_ALT 
(Opposite 
variable of the 
D.V.) 
? One of the non-ESO 
compensation vehicles 
(RSUs or BONUS) for 
year t minus one of the 
non-ESO compensation 
vehicles (RSUs or 
BONUS) for year t-1 
scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(Comp_alt t  – 
comp_alt t-1)  / 
(total compt  -
total compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 MISC_COMP 
 
? Miscellaneous 
compensation for year t 
minus miscellaneous 
compensation for year 
t-1 scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(MISC_COMP 
t  – 
MISC_COMP t-
1)  / (total 
compt  -total 
compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 SARs ? SARs for year t minus 
SARs for year t-1 
scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(SARs t  – 
SARs t-1)  / 
(total compt  -
total compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 SALARY
 
? Salary for year t minus 
Salary for year t-1 
scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(SALARY t  – 
SALARY t-1)  / 
(total compt  -
total compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 ALL_OTHER ? All other compensation 
for year t minus all 
other compensation for 
year t-1 scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(ALL_OTHER 
t  – 
ALL_OTHER t-
1)  / (total 
compt  -total 
compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 PENSION ? Pension for year t 
minus pension for year 
t-1 scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(PENSION t  – 
PENSION t-1)  / 
(total compt  -
total compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
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Category Proxy Sign Description Calculation Source Citation 
 PSUs ? PSUs for year t minus 
PSUs for year t-1 
scaled by total 
compensation for year t 
minus total 
compensation for year 
t-1. 
(PSUs t  – PSUs 
t-1)  / (total 
compt  -total 
compt-1) 
Proxy and 
F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 Industry 
Dummies 
? NAICS code 20 Industry 
Dummies 
FPInfomart Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 
ESOs typically do not accrue dividends to the option holder and this makes options less 
attractive to senior management (Carter et al., 2007, p. 339). However, restricted stock typically 
is dividend protected and therefore more valuable to the executive in firms that pay dividends 
regularly, (Carter et al., 2007, p. 339). ∆DIV_YLD is included to control for this and is measured 
as dividends per share divided by price per share at the end of the year.  
EQ_CONSTR and TENURE are included to control for the choice of equity versus non-
equity compensation. EQ_CONSTR is included to control for “firms that are close to their 
constraint on issuing equity,” (Carter et al., 2007, p. 339). These firms may be more likely to 
offer cash compensation. EQ_CONSTR was measured as the ratio of issued to authorized shares. 
If EQ_CONSTR is close to one, the firm has more constraints. “Individuals in the same position 
longer likely feel more stable and secure and therefore are likely to be less risk-averse,” (Carter et 
al., 2007, p.339). Risk-averse executives may prefer the certainty of fixed compensation 
compared to performance-based compensation and therefore TENURE is measured as the 
number of years the CEO has held that position and is included to control for CEO risk aversion.  
ln_TOTASSETS is the logarithm of total assets and RET is the annualized rate of return 
reflecting monthly price appreciation plus reinvestment of monthly dividends and the 
compounding effect of dividends paid on reinvested dividends as provided by and collected from 
Research Insight. RET is similar to CUM_RET (defined in Table 8) but is the percentage change 
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relative to the value 12 months previously (not 36). ROA is net income divided by total assets. 
These are additional standard economic determinants as identified by Carter et al. (2007) which 
were found to be significant when determining levels of RSUs as a component of executive 
compensation. 
The board of directors directly influences and determines the composition of executive 
compensation and therefore measures of their governance characteristics should be included in 
Model 2b. The governance index (WEAKGOV) is used as the proxy for these characteristics, and 
is as defined in Model 1 (Table 9).  
The calculation for ∆COMP_ALT varies depending on the dependent variable – for 
example, if the dependent variable is BONUS then ∆COMP_ALT is RSU scaled by total 
compensation for year t less RSU scaled by total compensation for year t-1. This is included to 
control for changes in the other forms of compensation that may occur concurrently with the 
change in ESOs, and that might also affect the change in the compensation alternative of interest.  
Similarly, all other components of total compensation (MISCCOMP, SARS, ALLOTHER, 
PENSION and PSUS)
12
 are also included in Model 2b and are as defined in Table 4. 
Understanding the relationship between changes in ESOs and RSUs is facilitated by holding the 
other compensation components constant. The industry variables included in Model 2b are also 
defined as in Table 4. Table 17 Columns Five and Six has the results for Model 2b which like 
Model 2a was estimated using seemingly unrelated regression.  
Descriptive Statistics and Multivariate Analysis 
Table 16 displays the descriptive statistics for Models 2a and b. The underlying 
distribution for bonus is skewed to the right. The medians for RSUs, SARs, PSUs MISC_COMP, 
ALL_OTHER_COMP and PENSION are likely zero because they were not commonly used -
many firm year observations did not have these as compensation components. 
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Table 16 
 
Descriptive Statistics on Compensation Alternatives and Variables Included in Model 2 
 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
RSU 0.09 0.00 1.49 
BONUS 0.74 0.18 19.21 
ESO 0.03 0.07 4.88 
lnSales 0.08 0.04 0.25 
BM -0.03 -0.02 0.40 
CASH_CONSTR 0.01 0.00 0.15 
NOL 0.54 0.00 2.98 
DIVCON 0.69 0.00 18.24 
3870 0.61 1.00 0.49 
DIVYLD 0.01 0.00 1.24 
ROA 0.35 0.00 7.61 
SALARY 0.32 0.04 9.95 
SARs 0.14 0.00 2.63 
PSUs 0.01 0.00 0.33 
MISC_COMP -0.78 0.00 25.80 
ALL_OTHER_COMP 0.28 0.00 9.69 
PENSION 0.00 0.00 0.12 
WEAKGOV 0.51 0.50 0.17 
TENURE 
EQ_CNSTR 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
0.00 
0.08 
0.55 
ln_ASSETS 0.15 0.08 0.29 
RET 0.13 0.13 0.56 
 
 
Table 17 shows the results from Model 2a. There were 1,049 firm year observations for 
the SUR. This is different than the 1,250 observations as stated in Table 2 because this is a 
changes model and 201 firm year observations were therefore lost. Column Three shows results 
for the dependent variable RSUs while Column Four shows the results for the dependent variable 
BONUS.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 76 
 
Table 17 
 
Substitution between ESOs and non-ESO Compensation Alternatives for the Pre-Amendment to 
Section 3870 (2000-2002) and the Post-Amendment to  
Section 3870 (2004-2006) Periods 
Model  Dependent Variable Dependent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Coefficient 
Model 2a 
∆RSU 
Model 2a 
∆BONUS 
Model 2b 
∆RSU 
Model 2b 
∆BONUS 
(1) (2) 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept ? -0.02 
(-0.11) 
2.76 
(0.61) 
0.18 
(0.79) 
0.16 
(0.17) 
∆ESO - 0.00 
(-0.15) 
-3.93**** 
(-27.27) 
-0.16**** 
(-8.16) 
-0.74**** 
(-15.66) 
3870 + 0.10 
(1.09) 
-1.74** 
(-1.94) 
0.17** 
(1.90) 
0.43** 
(1.77) 
∆ESO * 3870 - -0.06*** 
(-2.87) 
4.14**** 
(21.79) 
-0.07**** 
-3.19 
0.02 
(0.31) 
ln_Sales ? -0.08 
(-0.52) 
-1.41 
(-0.88) 
-0.05 
(-0.26) 
-0.03 
(-0.06) 
BM ? 0.11 
(0.99) 
-0.22 
(-0.20) 
-0.11 
(-0.95) 
-0.77††† 
(-2.49) 
CASH_CNSTR ? 0.04 
(0.14) 
5.83††  
(2.06) 
0.13 
(0.40) 
0.68 
(0.79) 
NOL ? -0.01 
(-0.73) 
-0.02 
(-0.11) 
-0.01 
(-0.59) 
0.00 
(0.04) 
DIVCON ? -0.00 
(-1.20) 
-0.01 
(-0.33) 
-0.00 
(-0.77) 
-0.00 
(-0.64) 
DIV_YLD ?   -0.01 
(-0.34) 
-0.02 
(-0.25) 
EQ_CONSTR ?   -0.03 
(-0.41) 
-0.09 
(-0.44) 
TENURE ?   -0.03 
(-0.06) 
0.52 
(0.33) 
ln_TOTASSETS ?   0.07 
(0.39) 
0.82† 
(1.65) 
WEAKGOV ?   0.14 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.52) 
RET ?   -0.04 
(-0.46) 
-0.03 
(-0.11) 
ROA ?   -0.01 
(-1.35) 
-0.04†† 
(-2.15) 
COMP_ALT ?   -0.22†††† 
(-19.59) 
-1.56†††† 
(-19.59) 
ALLOTHER ?   -0.15†††† 
(-15.51) 
-0.62†††† 
(-33.50) 
PENSION ?   0.02 
(0.06) 
 
-0.03 
(-0.03) 
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Model  Dependent Variable Dependent Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variable 
Dependent 
Variables 
Predicted 
Coefficient 
Model 2a 
∆RSU 
Model 2a 
∆BONUS 
Model 2b 
∆RSU 
Model 2b 
∆BONUS 
(1) (2) 
(3) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
PSUS ?   -0.67†††† 
(-4.73) 
1.11††† 
(2.88) 
SALARY ?   -0.07††††  
(-6.48) 
-0.41††††  
(-14.90) 
Industry Dummies  YES YES YES YES 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
 1049 1049 965 965 
System Weighted 
R-Square
 
 0.28 0.28 0.95 0.95 
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed.  ***p < .01, two-tailed. ****p < .001, two-tailed. 
†p < .10, one-tailed. ††p < .05, one-tailed. †††p < .01, one-tailed. ††††p < .001one-tailed. 
 
RSUs. The coefficient on ∆ESO is zero and not significant. This indicates that RSUs did 
not substitute for ESOs in the pre-amendment period. As predicted, the interaction between 
∆ESO and 3870 has a significantly negative coefficient for this model which supports the first 
part of H7b – the substitution rate of RSUs to ESOs is less unequal relative to the pre-amendment 
period. More specifically, the incremental substitution rate is 6 cents of RSUs for one dollar of 
ESOs. The sum of δ1 + δ3 is -0.06 and significantly different than zero (F = 21.12, p < 0.0001). 
The post-amendment substitution rate of 0.06 is also closer to that found in Hall and Murphy 
(2002) of $0.75 RSUs per $1.00 ESOs ($375,000 in RSUs for $500,000 ESOs). 
Post hoc Analysis. Since the increase in use of bonuses was unexpected they were 
included as a dependent variable after the initial univariate analysis finding. The coefficient on 
∆ESO is significantly negative when BONUS is the dependent variable suggesting that bonuses 
did substitute for ESOs in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. The interaction between 
3870 and ∆ESO has a significantly positive coefficient. The average substitution rate for bonuses 
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per dollar of ESOs in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period was 21 cents (-3.93 + 4.14). 
Once again, the sum of δ1 + δ3 is significantly (weakly) different than zero (F = 3.00, p < 0.0832). 
Model 2b RSUs. Column Five Table 17 has the results for RSUs and as predicted, the 
coefficient on ∆ESO is significantly negative suggesting that RSUs do substitute for ESOs in the 
pre-amendment to Section 3870 period (16 cents of RSUs per one dollar of ESOs). Under this 
version of the model, the sign for 3870 is also as predicted and significant. The interaction 
between 3870 and ∆ESO has a significantly negative coefficient of -0.07 which supports H7b 
predicting a less unequal substitution rate between RSUs and ESOs in the post-amendment to 
Section 3870 period. The substitution rate for RSUs and ESOs in the post amendment period was 
23 cents (F = 236.22, p < 0.0001) which is closer to the substitution rate suggested by Hall and 
Murphy (2002), 75 cents of RSUs per one dollar of ESOs, supporting the second half of H7b. 
 Model 2b - Bonus. The coefficient on ∆ESO for the pre-amendment to Section 3870 
period is significantly negative, which suggests that bonuses substituted for ESOs in the pre-
amendment to Section 3870 period. The substitution rate for bonuses and ESOs in the post-
amendment to Section 3870 period is 72 cents of bonuses per dollar of ESOs (F = 345.46 p 
<0.0001). This finding is closer to Hall and Murphy’s (2002) prediction for substitution rates 
between cash compensation and bonuses ($300,000 in cash for $500,000 in ESOs or 60 cents of 
cash compensation for one dollar of ESOs) for the post-amendment to Section 3870 period. 
Supplemental Analysis. A supplemental test was completed based on Barth and Kallapur 
(1996) where the compensation components were not scaled by total compensation. Instead, the 
reciprocal of the change in total compensation was added to the regression as an independent 
variable. Models 2b was then run with the new variable included.  While not tabulated, the 
coefficients for ∆ESO in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period are significantly positive for 
both RSU (0.06, p < 0.001) and BONUS (0.07, p < 0.001) suggesting that both increased or 
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decreased with ESOs in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period. These findings do not 
support H7a. Substitution rates for bonuses were two cents per dollar of ESOs based on Model 2b 
and six cents of RSUs for one dollar of ESOs. In summary, substitution rates are not as close 
under this version of Model 2b to Hall and Murphy’s (2002) prediction; however, the results 
suggest there is support for H7b in that the substitution rate of ESOs for RSUs did become less 
unequal post-amendment to section 3870.     
Summary 
 The results reveal that firms substitute RSUs for ESOs in the pre- and post-amendment to 
Section 3870 periods on an unequal basis, although as predicted in the post-amendment to 
Section 3870 this substitution is less unequal. These findings confirm Hypothesis 7a and part of 
H7b. Canadian firms substitute 23 cents of RSUs for one dollar of ESOs in the post-amendment 
to Section 3870 period. This substitution rate of 23 cents of RSUs per dollar of ESOs is closer to 
Hall and Murphy’s (2002) prediction of 75 cents of RSUs for one dollar of ESOs than the pre-
amendment rate of 16-cents of RSUs per one dollar of ESOs.  
Hypothesis 8 
Model and Variables 
Finally, the relationship between senior management pay and company stock-price 
performance was investigated. The model presented below is derived from a model used in 
Craighead, Magnan, and Thorne (2004). They state that “…prior theoretical and empirical 
findings suggest that ROE and RET jointly provide boards of directors with complementary 
information about a firm’s performance that is relevant for executive compensation 
determination,” (Craighead et al., 2004, p. 380). The following model was used to determine if 
the pay-performance relationship has improved since the amendment to Section 3870: 
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(3a) ln_TCjt = β0 + β1ROEjt + β2RETjt + β33870jt + [β43870jt * ROEjt] 
 + [ β53870jt * RETjt] + ε 
  
Table 18 summarizes Model 3a providing sign predictions, descriptions and calculations 
and is presented below. 
Table 18 
Table of Variables for Model 3a 
Category Proxy Sign Hypothesis Description Calculation Source Citation 
D.V. ln_TC  H8 Natural logarithm of 
total compensation 
Natural log of 
total 
compensation 
Proxy Carter et 
al., 2007; 
Craighead 
et al., 2004 
 ROE + H8 Accounting return on 
equity (as calculated 
and provided by 
FPInfomart when 
available) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Net income 
before 
discontinued 
operations – 
preferred 
dividends] / 
[average 
beginning-and-
end-of-year 
common 
shareholders’ 
equity] 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S  
Craighead 
et al., 2004  
 RET + H8 Annual rates of return 
reflecting monthly 
price appreciation, 
plus reinvestment of 
monthly dividends and 
the compounding 
effect of dividends 
paid on reinvested 
dividends. Based on a 
percentage change of 
the value over 12 
months  
Annual rate of 
return 
RI Craighead 
et al., 2004 
3870 ? H8 Indicator variable set 
equal to one if the 
observation is from 
the post-section 3870 
period and zero if the 
observation is from 
the pre-section 3870 
period 
1 or 0 F/S Brown and 
Lee, 2007; 
Craighead 
et al., 2004  
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The dependent variable (ln_TC) is the natural logarithm of total compensation for senior 
management of firm j in fiscal year t. ROE is the accounting return on equity of firm j in fiscal 
year t as calculated and collected from FPInfomart and defined in Table 18. RET is the stock 
market return of firm j in fiscal year t collected from Research Insight and as defined above in the 
variable discussion for Model 2b.  
 3870 is an indicator variable set equal to one if the observation is from the post 
amendment to Section 3870 period (2004-2006) and zero if the observation is from the pre-
amendment to Section 3870 period (2000-2002). The interaction between 3870 and ROE and 
RET is included in Model 3a to test H8, i.e. if the relationship between total compensation and 
shareholder wealth has improved since the amendment to Section 3870.  
Extension to Model 3a 
Additional variables were added to Model 3a to control for other determinants of 
executive compensation. Model 3a did not include these variables because it was of interest to 
initially isolate the relationship between total compensation and performance and follow a more 
basic model for pay-for-performance. Similar to Model 2b, Model 3b has been modified to 
include other items that have been determined to affect how total compensation is derived. These 
additional variables were included in Model 3b because it was determined that they also affect 
total compensation (i.e. executive compensation is not solely based upon firm performance) 
(Brown & Lee, 2007; Carter et al., 2007).  
Model 3b is shown below and includes the following economic determinants: 
(3b) ln_TCjt = β0 + β1ROEjt-1 + β2RETjt-1 + β33870jt + [β43870jt * ROEjt-1] 
 + [ β53870jt * RETjt-1] + β6 WEAKGOVjt +  β7 ln_REVENUESjt +  β8 DEBT_EQUITYjt  
+  β9BMjt + β10 CASH_CONSTRjt +  β11 NOLjt +  β12 DIVCONjt + ∑ Industry Dummies  
+ ε 
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 Table 19 summarizes the definitions for the variables used in Model 3b. All variables that 
are the same as those used in Model 3a are defined in Table 18 above. 
Table 19 
Table of Variables for Model 3b 
Category Proxy Sign Description Calculation Source Citation 
Corporate 
Governance 
 
WEAKGOV ? Governance index as 
defined in Table 9 
See Table 9 Proxy  
CS20 ? CS20 is an indicator 
variable that is equal 
to one if the firm is 
closely held (owns 
20% or more) and 
zero otherwise 
1 or 0 Proxy Park et al., 
2001 
 ln_REVENUES ? The natural logarithm 
of revenues 
Logarithm of 
revenues 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 DEBT_EQUITY ? The ratio of debt to  
shareholders’ equity 
Debt / Equity FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Craighead 
et al., 2004  
 BM ? the year-end book 
value of equity 
divided by the year-
end market value of 
equity 
Year-end B.V 
equity / year-
end market 
value of equity 
 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
and/or 
CFMRC 
Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 CASH_CONSTR ? [Cash flow from 
operations -(common 
and preferred 
dividends + cash flow 
used in investing / 
total assets] 
[Cash flow 
from operations 
-(common and 
preferred 
dividends + 
cash flow used 
in investing )/ 
total assets ] 
FPInfomart 
and/or F/S 
Carter et 
al., 2007 
 NOL ? The tax loss carry-
forward for year t  
Tax loss carry-
forwardt  
RI Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 DIVCON ? [(Retained earnings + 
cash dividend)t / cash 
dividendt-1]t   
[(R/E + Cash 
dividends)t / 
Cash 
dividendst-1]t  
RI Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 Industry 
Dummies 
? NAICS code 20 Industry 
dummies 
FPInfomart Brown and 
Lee, 2007 
 
ROE and RET are defined as in Model 3a and the variables 3870, Governance Variables, 
BM, CASHCONSTR, NOL, and DIVCON are all defined in Table 19 for firm j in fiscal year t. 
ln_REVENUES is defined as the natural logarithm of revenues for firm j in fiscal year t. 
DEBT_EQUITY is defined as the ratio of debt to shareholders equity for firm j in fiscal year t.  
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Descriptive Statistics and Multivariate Analysis 
 Table 20 below shows the descriptive statistics for the variables in Model 3a and b. The 
underlying distributions for DEBT_EQUITY and NOL appear to be slightly skewed to the right.  
Table 20 
 
Descriptive Statistics on Pay-for-Performance Variables 
 
Variable Mean Median  Std. Dev. 
ln_TC 15.31 15.29 1.00 
ROE 0.91 1.15 2.11 
RET 0.11 0.12 0.56 
WEAKGOV 4.14 4.00 1.37 
CS20 0.43 0.00 0.50 
ln_REVENUES 13.76 13.60 1.71 
DEBT_EQUITY 2.63 1.31 4.11 
BM 0.08 0.06 0.16 
CASH_CONSTR -0.03 -0.00 0.13 
NOL 1.21 0.00 4.55 
DIVCON 0.16 0.03 0.26 
 
Table 21 shows the results for Model 3a. Data for the year 2003 has been excluded for the 
reasons previously stated, resulting in 1246 firm year observations, with the results for these 
observations shown in Column Three. Column Four shows the regression results with firms 
having student residuals greater than two also removed (which resulted in 71 firm year 
observations being excluded).  
The industry variables included in Model 3b are also defined as in Table 8. Of the original 
1246 firm year observations, 37 observations had to be excluded because of missing data. Table 
21 Column 5 below shows the results for Model 3b. Column 6 shows the regression results after 
excluding 65 observations as outliers (i.e. the regression diagnostics showed them as having 
student residuals greater than two).  
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Table 21 
 
Pay for Performance Sensitivities of Total Compensation 
 
(1) 
Variables 
(2) 
Predicted 
Coefficients 
(3) 
Model 3a 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(4) 
Model 3a 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(5) 
Model 3b 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(6) 
Model 3b 
(N.O.) 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
(7) 
Model 3b 
Median split 
MEDESO 
Coefficient 
(t-value) 
Intercept ? 15.01**** 
(381.26) 
14.96**** 
(405.84) 
13.03**** 
(33.57) 
12.59**** 
(36.49) 
12.90**** 
(32.52) 
ROE + 0.13**** 
(7.59) 
0.13**** 
(8.44) 
0.05**** 
(3.14) 
0.03** 
(1.97) 
0.02 
(1.13) 
RET + -0.11** 
(-1.67) 
-0.18*** 
(-2.93) 
0.04 
(0.82) 
-0.01 
(-0.14) 
0.09 
(1.15) 
3870 ? 0.51**** 
(8.41) 
0.55**** 
(10.08) 
0.22**** 
(4.67) 
0.23**** 
(5.50) 
0.20**** 
(3.21) 
3870*ROE + -0.10**** 
(-3.93) 
-0.11**** 
(-4.63) 
-0.03 
(-1.23) 
-0.02 
(-0.99) 
0.00 
(0.14) 
3870*RET + 0.07 
(0.73) 
0.15** 
(1.71) 
-0.03 
(-0.36) 
0.00 
(0.02) 
-0.05 
(-0.43) 
ROE*MEDESO -     0.04** 
(1.63) 
RET*MEDESO -     -0.10 
(-0.91) 
3870*ROE*MEDESO +     -0.06* 
(-1.34) 
3870*RET*MEDESO +     0.00 
(0.02) 
MEDESO ?     0.01 
(0.12) 
WEAKGOV ?   0.10†††† 
(5.60) 
0.08†††† 
(5.35) 
0.09††††  
(5.38) 
CS20 ?   -0.11††† 
(-2.46) 
-0.10††† 
(-2.55) 
-0.13††† 
(-2.68) 
REVENUES ?   0.26†††† 
(16.23) 
0.30†††† 
(19.56) 
0.27†††† 
(16.39) 
DEBT/EQUITY ?   0.03†††† 
(3.86) 
0.03†††† 
(4.33) 
0.02††††  
(3.56) 
BM ?   -0.71†††† 
(-5.64) 
-1.10††††  
(-7.00) 
-0.74†††† 
(-5.73) 
CASHCONSTR ?   -0.12 
(-0.68) 
-0.02 
(-0.10) 
-0.17 
(-0.94) 
NOL ?   0.02†††† 
(4.89) 
0.00†††† 
(5.00) 
0.02††††  
(4.74) 
DIVCON ?   -0.23††† 
(-2.64) 
-0.00††† 
(-3.64) 
-0.21†††  
(-2.45) 
Industry    YES YES YES 
N  1246 1175 1209 1144 1212 
Adjusted R
2 
 0.09 0.13 0.47 0.57 0.48 
*p < .10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed.  ***p < .01, two-tailed. ****p < .001, two-tailed. 
†p < .10, one-tailed. ††p < .05, one-tailed. †††p < .01, one-tailed. ††††p < .001one-tailed. 
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Model 3a. There is a significantly positive relationship between ROE and total 
compensation, indicating that compensation is at least in part determined by return on equity in 
the pre-amendment period. The significantly negative interaction term 3870*ROE indicates that 
the relationship between total compensation and return on equity is less sensitive than in the pre-
amendment to Section 3870 period. The sum of β1 and β4 was positive 0.03 (0.13 + -0.10) and 
was not found to be significantly different than zero (F = 1.43, p < 0.23). 
There is a significantly negative coefficient on the variable RET. When outliers are 
removed the interaction term 3870*RET is significant (see Column 4). However the sum of β2 
and β5 was -0.03 (-0.18 + 0.15) which was also not found to be significantly different than zero (F 
= 0.13, p < 0.72).  
Both ROE and RET are performance measures and are combined for further analysis with 
a focus on the post-amendment period. The coefficients on the interaction terms suggest no 
improvement in pay for performance after the amendment to 3870, and thus the prediction in H8 
of an increase in the pay-for-performance relationship is not supported. In particular, the sum of 
β4 and β5 was -0.03 (-0.10 + 0.07) which was not found to be significantly different than zero (F = 
0.23, p < 0.63). Overall this indicates that there was not a significant relationship between 
performance and executive pay in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period.   
Model 3b. Model 3b (see Table 21 Columns 5 and 6) results show a positive relationship 
between ROE and total compensation in the pre-amendment period, but show a non significant 
relationship between ROE and total compensation in the post-amendment period. From Column 
5, the sum of β1 and β4 is 0.02 (0.05 + -0.03) which is not significantly different than zero (F = 
1.29, p < 0.26). The evidence suggests that there was a positive pay for performance relationship 
in the pre-amendment period but this relationship has not improved or worsened in the post-
amendment to Section 3870 period. Model 3b also shows a non significant relationship between 
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total compensation and RET in the pre- and post-amendment periods which is slightly different 
from Model 3a. 
The coefficients for ROE and RET were combined for further analysis to determine if 
there was an improvement in pay for performance in the post-amendment period. The sum of β4 
and β5 was -0.02 (-0.02 + 0.00) which was not found to be significantly different than zero (F = 
0.07, p < 0.79) indicating that there was not a significant relationship between pay and 
performance in the post-amendment period. 
Supplemental Analysis. An additional supplemental post hoc analysis was conducted to 
examine if the firms that had larger decreases in ESOs had larger increases in pay for 
performance sensitivities. In order to do this, firms were classified as having a large or small ESO 
reduction surrounding the amendment to Section 3870 based on their change in ESOs between 
the years 2004 and 2002. This was done by calculating ESOs scaled by total compensation for 
2004 minus ESOs scaled by total compensation for 2002
13
. The median (-1.20%) was used to 
split the firms into two groups. Firms that had greater decreases than the median were coded as 
one; whereas firms with smaller decreases than the median were coded as zero (for example a 
firm with a reduction of 4% is said to have a greater decrease than the median). Interactions 
between ROE and MEDESO and RET and MEDESO were included in the model to determine 
pay for performance sensitivities in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period for these firms. 
These coefficients are predicted to be negative because firms that had greater reductions in ESOs 
because they were using them for earnings management or opportunistic reasons would 
theoretically have had worse pay for performance relationships in the pre-amendment period, 
compared to firms that experienced smaller reductions in ESOs because they were using them for 
pay for performance reasons. Interactions between ROE, MEDESO and 3870 and RET, 
MEDESO and 3870 were included to proxy for firms with large decreases in ESOs in the post 
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amendment to Section 3870 period and the coefficients for these variables are predicted to be 
positive based on Hypothesis 8.  
Results are shown in Table 21, Column 7. These results indicate that there is a 
significantly positive relationship between ROE and total compensation in the pre-amendment to 
Section 3870 period (ROE*MEDESO) for firms who subsequently had greater reductions of 
ESOs. The relationship between RET and total compensation in the pre-amendment period 
(RET*MEDESO) for firms with greater reductions of ESOs is negative although not significant. 
Combining these coefficients to determine if there was a relationship between the return 
measures and total compensation (β1 + β2 + β6 + β7) resulted in a value of 0.05 (0.02 + 0.09 + 0.04 
+ -0.10). This was not found to be significantly different than zero (F = 0.63, p < 0.43) and 
indicates that there is not a significant relationship between executive pay and firm performance.  
In contrast, there is a significantly negative relationship between ROE and total 
compensation in the post-amendment period for these firms (3870*ROE*MEDESO).  There was 
no apparent relationship between RET and total compensation in the post-amendment period for 
firms with larger ESO reductions. However, the sum of β4, β5, β8, and β9 was -0.11 (0.00 + -0.05 
+ -0.06 + 0.00) which is not significantly different than zero (F = 0.91, p < 0.34). This contrast 
test implies that firms who reduced ESO use more than the median did not improve pay for 
performance sensitivities in the post-amendment to Section 3870 relative to the pre-amendment 
period, contrary to the assumptions underlying H8. In sum, these findings indicate that firms’ pay 
for performance relationships did not change post-amendment to Section 3870
14
. 
Summary 
Hypothesis 8 predicts an increase in pay for performance sensitivities after the 
amendment to Section 3870. It appears that pay for performance sensitivities have neither 
improved nor worsened post-amendment to Section 3870.  
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Conclusions 
The amendment to Section 3870 required Canadian firms to begin expensing the value of 
ESOs in their financial statements, which had previously not been done. This study examined 
changes in the use of ESOs as a component of executive compensation associated with the 
amendment to Section 3870. The related change in use of other compensation components was 
explored as well as what firm factors were associated with changes in ESO use. This study also 
looked at the change in the rate of substitution between ESOs and restricted stock options and 
bonuses, and the changes in the pay for performance relationship, subsequent to the amendment.  
There were two competing rationales used to explain the increase in ESO use in the pre-
amendment to section 3870 period. The pay for performance rationale suggests that firms 
increased ESO use because ESOs were used as a means to align shareholder and manager goals. 
Preferential accounting treatment leading to managerial opportunism and earnings management 
was the second rationale identified. A summary of my results are presented below linking my 
findings to the aforementioned rationales.     
First, it was found that there was a statistically significant decrease in ESO use after the 
amendment to Section 3870 was passed. ESO use as a percentage of total compensation went 
from a mean of 23.67% in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period to 15.50% in the post-
amendment to Section 3870 period. This finding suggests that some firms were using ESOs for 
earnings management or opportunistic purposes. This study also looked at increases in other 
types of stock based compensation around the amendment to Section 3870. There was an increase 
in the use of RSUs (from 8.7% of firms in 2000 to 32.2% in 2006), PSUs (from zero firms in 
2000 to almost 7% in 2006), and SARs (from almost 5% in 2000 to 8.3% in 2006) for Canadian 
firms. However, it is important to note that ESOs are still the dominant choice for stock-based 
compensation, accounting for almost 16% of total compensation in the post-amendment period. 
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In addition to this, 61% of firms are still using ESOs in their executive compensation packages 
suggesting that pay for performance factors may be more important than opportunism or earnings 
management when designing executive compensation contracts.  
Second, it was found that firms that are more politically visible reduced ESO use more 
than firms that are less publicly visible. However, no support for other factors associated with 
managerial opportunism or earnings management was found, such as weak corporate governance, 
earnings benchmarks, or debt covenants. These findings suggest that firms that would have been 
expected to engage in earnings management or managerial opportunism did not significantly 
decrease ESO use when the favorable accounting treatment that would enable such behaviors 
ended. These findings are quite different from Brown and Lee (2007) who found support for their 
hypotheses relating to earnings management. It appears that ESO use was more closely tied to 
earnings management in the U.S.   
Similar to Brown and Lee (2007), this study found that the substitution rate between 
RSUs and ESOs was not dollar for dollar. Using an extended model of Brown and Lee’s 2007, 
the substitution rate in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period was determined to be 16 cents 
of RSUs for one dollar of ESOs. This finding supports H7a which predicts an unequal 
substitution rate between RSUs and ESOs with RSUs being substituted on a less than dollar-for-
dollar basis. Using the same extended model it was also discovered that RSUs substituted for 
ESOs in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period at a rate of 23 cents of RSUs for one dollar 
of ESOs. This substitution rate was less unequal than in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 
period, and is closer to Hall and Murphy’s (2002) theoretical substitution rate, supporting H7b. 
These results suggest that RSUs did become more preferred by firms once the favorable 
accounting treatment for ESOs was removed. 
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The pay-for-performance relationship was also examined in this study and it was found 
that the reduction in ESO use did not on average strengthen this relationship. Moreover, firms 
that reduced ESO use more did not have an improvement in pay for performance. It may be that 
other types of stock-based compensation used in place of ESOs do not have the same 
motivational effect of ESOs.  
 This paper extends Brown and Lee’s 2007 study by refining their models, considering 
temporal trends, examining pay for performance sensitivities and by using a different setting. 
Models were replicated and then refined to help understand the effects of the different setting 
versus the effects of the model extensions. The refinements increased adjusted R
2
 and improved 
the overall explanatory power. This study used a Canadian setting which is interesting because 
there was no pro forma disclosure in Canada until 2002, firms in Canada are on average smaller 
than U.S. firms and the industry structure in Canada is different.  
There were several limitations in this study. First of all, due to data availability, there 
were some data that could not be collected that were used in Brown and Lee (2007), specifically 
ACC_VEST measuring accelerated vesting, and IMPACT measuring the magnitude of ESO 
expense. Second, some variables that were included in this study may not have sufficiently 
captured the underlying theoretical construct. Some examples of these are the proxies used for the 
hypotheses relating to debt covenants and earnings benchmarks. In addition to these variables, 
there has been discussion over the proxy for firm size. This variable was measured the same way 
as Brown and Lee (2007) and Carter et al. (2007), and there are no obvious reasons why this is 
not an equally good measure for the Canadian setting. Although politically visibility was a 
significant factor contributing to ESO decrease, the proxies used for political visibility could 
alternatively be based on the number of news articles for sample firms as an alternative proxy.  
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Another limitation of this study was the attempt at creating an index variable 
(WEAKGOV) for corporate governance. This index was intended to aid in interpretation; 
however this index was not significant. One possible explanation is that some proxies used for 
corporate governance may not have captured the intended behavior. Another reason that the 
index might not have worked is because not all governance variables identified in Core and Guay 
(1999) were available in Canada. There were also competing findings on the prediction of some 
of the various governance proxies (i.e. INSIDEDIR).  
 The strong stock market was identified early on as a possible contributor for the increase 
in ESOs prior to the amendment to Section 3870. While this rationale was not explored further, 
the strong stock market could have contributed to the increased use in ESOs in the pre-
amendment period and continued use in the post-amendment period. This creates an opportunity 
for future research.  
Future research could also extend this study past the year 2006 as well as increase the size 
of the sample, as the number of firm year observations (1246) was smaller than Brown and Lee’s 
(2007). Less statistical power may be one reason why I did not get significance for some of my 
variables. Finally, it would be interesting to examine non-ESO stock-based compensation, more 
specifically RSUs, and the resulting pay for performance sensitivities as use of such share-based 
compensation alternatives increases.  
The pattern of results suggests that opportunism and earnings management may have 
affected ESO use, given the response to the 3870 amendment. However, the traditional factors 
associated with opportunism and earnings management were not significant in my setting. In 
addition, the ongoing popularity of ESOs both as a percent of management compensation and the 
frequency of firms still using ESOs even after the amendment suggest that opportunism and 
earnings management were not the major determinants of ESO use. Further work is needed to 
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fully understand whether pay for performance is a major factor in ESO use, and the role of other 
factors such as increasing stock prices. 
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Notes 
1
 Cross-sectional differences related to factors affecting how firms restructure compensation was 
not explored due to sample size constraints. 
2
 There are not enough firms in the sample that choose to motivate their employees with PSUs 
(29 firm year observations) and SARs (73 firm year observations) therefore these types of stock-
based compensation cannot be fully investigated with the existing sample. Originally there were 
hypotheses to include all types of non-ESO stock-based compensation (RSUs, SARs and PSUs), 
but after the data was collected it was determined there were not enough observations to proceed 
with hypothesis testing. 
3
 One firm switched to U.S. GAAP in the pre-amendment to Section 3870 period and 21 firms 
switched in the post-amendment to Section 3870 period. They were still included in the sample. 
35 firms were cross-listed meaning they disclose in U.S. and Canadian GAAP. Firms that cross-
listed disclosed the pro-forma ESO expense the same time the U.S. required it.  
4
 This turned out not to be the case and all banks and financial institutions have been included in 
all models as they were early adopters of Section 3870 and make up a large portion of the 
Canadian market on a market valuation basis. 
5
 Compensation data is disclosed in the proxy statement following that firm’s year end. For 
example if a firm’s year end is December 2005, the compensation data for that firm is usually 
disclosed by April 2006. Compensation data in the proxy circular for April 2006 is for the year 
2005 and was allocated to the year 2005 for all models. Compensation for the year 2005 would 
most likely reflect performance for that year (i.e. 2005).  
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6
 These numbers differ from the 175 firms used in Model 1 because some firms used non-ESO 
stock based compensation. These firms also fit the original inclusion criteria of (1) being on the 
FP 500 list and (2) having information available for two years in the pre-amendment and two 
years in the post-amendment to Section 3870 periods.  
7
 A number of variables have been scaled to get all variables to a similar order of magnitude to 
reduce floating point errors in computing the statistics. 
8
 This treatment of ESOs settled in cash was consistent throughout the paper.  
9
 In Canada outside ownership is disclosed at 10% (this relates to the ability to calculate 
NONCEOOWN and OUTOWN) and therefore these definitions differ slightly from Core et al.’s 
(1999). There was enough data disclosed in the proxies to calculate OUTDIROWN given Core et 
al.’s (1999) definition. 
10
 A number of tests were conducted to ensure the underlying assumptions for an OLS regression 
were met. Diagnostic tests do not suggest that heteroscedasticity (as determined by White’s, 
1980), autocorrelation (as determined by the Durbin-Watson test), multicollinearity (variance 
inflation factors) were significant issues.  
11
 For example, the formula for RSUs for the year 2001 looked as follows: (RSUs2001 – RSUs2000) 
/ (Total Compensation2001 – Total Compensation2000). 
12
 LTIP% was left out of Model 2b to reduce the chance of collinearity.  
 
13
 (ESO/TC)2004 - (ESO/TC)2002 
 
14
 Supplemental analysis was done on Model 3a and 3b by year to determine temporal trends.    
Model 3a and 3b were run with and without outliers. Coefficients were very similar for ROE and 
RET for pre and post years compared to the values in Table 21, therefore no changes in results 
were found.  
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Measuring and Valuing Total Stock 
Option Holdings 
 The value of stock options is measured using the Black-Scholes formula as modified by 
Merton (1973) and applied in the Hall and Liebman study, (1998). The value of options is: 
(3) Voptions = N[Pe
-dTΦ(Z) – Ee-rTΦ(Z - σ√T)], 
Where 
(4) Z = ln(P/E) + T(r – d + σ2/2) / σ√T , 
N = number of shares 
P = price of underlying stock 
E = exercise price of the option 
T = time to expiration 
r = risk-free interest rate (bond rate) 
d = expected dividend rate 
ζ = expected standard deviation of stock return 
Φ = cumulative probability function for normal distribution. 
 
